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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Alan Wright*
LaDawn H. Conway**
Debra J.McComas***

I.

INTRODUCTION

N recent years, the Texas Supreme Court has emphasized that the
spirit embodied in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure disfavors
disposing of appeals based upon harmless procedural defects.' The
cases decided by the supreme court during this Survey period continue to
reflect this spirit. In fact, the Texas Supreme Court refuses to elevate
form over substance.
For example, the supreme court held in a series of cases beginning with
Verburgt v. Dorner that the filing of a motion for extension of time is
implied when a perfection instrument is filed without such a motion
within the fifteen-day period in which the rules permit parties to seek an
extension of time.2 Moreover, in two mandamus proceedings, the
supreme court ensured relief for each relator despite finding no mandamus jurisdiction over the challenged orders. 3 Similarly, the supreme
court decisively held during the Survey period that Rule 276 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure "is not the exclusive means of preserving error
' 4
for refusing a charge request.
Decisions by the courts of appeals mimic the supreme court's more
generous construction of the rules of civil and appellate procedure. During the Survey period, for example, the Houston First Court of Appeals
held that a motion for sanctions requesting a substantive change in the
judgment that is filed within thirty days after the trial court's judgment,
*
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1. See, e.g., Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994); Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993).

2. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997); Holmes v. Home State County
Mutual Ins. Co., 958 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1997); Harlan v. Howe State Bank, 958 S.W.2d 380
(Tex. 1997); Boyd v. American Indemnity Co., 958 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1997); Jones v. City of
Houston, 976 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1998).
3. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); In re

Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
4. Dallas Mkt. Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. 1997).
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constitutes a "motion to modify or reform [the] judgment" under Rule
329b(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereby extends the
trial court's plenary power. 5 Similarly, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto that assails the
trial court's judgment and is filed within the time period for filing a mo6
tion for new trial operates to extend the appellate timetable.
In other areas, the courts of appeals continue to struggle with the
proper standards of review in the wake of the Daubert-Robinson-Havner
decisions, 7 and in cases where the standard of proof is "clear and convincing" evidence. 8
Finally, as appellate practitioners experience an ever-increasing
number of transferred appeals as a result of the supreme court's effort to
equalize appellate court dockets, the courts of appeals are acknowledging
the reality of conflicts in holdings between the transferror and transferring appellate courts. However, at least the Texarkana and San Antonio
Courts of Appeals have made it clear that, if a conflict exists between one
of their decisions and the stare decisis of the appellate district court from
which a case has been transferred, "it is for the Texas Supreme Court to
resolve." 9
II.

APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A.

MANDAMUS

1. Mandamus Relief (Effectively) Granted: No Jurisdiction
The relators in two mandamus proceedings decided in the Survey period found themselves with the mandamus relief they requested despite
the Texas Supreme Court's finding of no mandamus jurisdiction. In the
case of In re Smith Barney, Inc., 10 the court found no abuse of discretion,
but effectively gave the relator its requested relief by overruling the precedent relied upon by the trial court. In the case of In re Colonial Pipeline Co., Inc.,' Ithe court found that the relators had an adequate remedy
by appeal to challenge the trial court's scheduling orders, but nonetheless
granted mandamus relief in the "interests of judicial economy." 2
5. Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equip., Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. filed).
6. See Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no

pet.).

7. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. filed) (applying Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993)); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995);
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997)).
8. Spangler v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 256
(Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet.).
9. Perez v. Murff, 972 S.W.2d 78, 86 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied);
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 933 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
10. 975 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
11. 968 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 601.
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No Abuse of Discretion

In Smith Barney, relator Smith Barney was sued in Texas by five plaintiffs. 13 Plaintiffs' sole connection with the State was the fact that one of
the plaintiff corporations was a Texas corporation. 14 Smith Barney
moved to dismiss the Texas lawsuit on grounds of forum non conveniens,
arguing that all of the events, alleged wrongdoings, witnesses, and evidence were located in New York, Poland, and Great Britain and that New
York law would apply.15 In response, plaintiffs cited H. Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency1 6 for the proposition that a suit brought in Texas by
a corporation qualified to do business in the State cannot be dismissed on
the basis of forum non conveniens. 17 The trial court recognized that the
case did not belong in Texas, but acknowledged itself bound by the precedent established in Rouw.' 8 As a result, the trial court reluctantly denied
Smith Barney's motion to dismiss.1 9
Smith Barney sought mandamus relief from the supreme court after
the court of appeals denied its petition for writ of mandamus. 20 The
court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by following
existing precedent.2 1 The court further stated, however, that
although a lower court ordinarily should not be said to have abused
its discretion in following existing law, even if that law is no longer
valid or should be significantly changed, in denying mandamus relief
it is appropriate to state what the correct
law is in order to permit the
2
lower court to reconsider its decision. 2
The court proceeded to overrule Rouw and disapprove of those cases
adopting Rouw, "free[ing] the [trial] court ...

to consider the application

of the forum non conveniens doctrine to this case unconstrained by
Rouw."

23

Justice Hankinson, joined by three other Justices, filed a concurring
opinion questioning the court's authority to overrule binding precedent,
while finding no abuse of discretion and denying Smith Barney's mandamus petition. 24 Justice Hankinson warned that "[b]y relaxing mandamus
standards to in effect grant Smith Barney relief," the court "retreats from
our mandamus standards and contravenes our duty to promote certainty
'25
and predictability in the law."
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

975 S.W.2d at 594.
See id.
See id. at 594-95.
154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref'd).
See Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d at 595.
See id.
See id. at 600.
See id. at 595.
See id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 598.
See id. at 600 (Hankinson, J.,concurring).
Id. at 601.
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Adequate Remedy by Appeal

In Colonial Pipeline, the relators sought mandamus relief from a discovery order and scheduling orders entered by the trial court. 26 The
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the discovery order by
mandamus, but acknowledged that the defendants had an adequate rem27
edy by appeal to challenge errors in the trial court's scheduling orders.
Nonetheless, the court granted mandamus relief on the scheduling orders
in the "interests of judicial economy. '28
2.

Mandamus Relief Granted: Jurisdiction
a. Sanctions Orders

Appeal is not an adequate remedy if the trial court's sanction order
imposes a monetary penalty on the party's prospective exercise of legal
rights. 29 In Ford, the trial court's order directed Ford Motor Company to
pay $25,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs and an additional $25,000 if
it filed a mandamus proceeding challenging the sanction order. 30 The
court found that because Ford had not abused the discovery process,
there was no basis for the award of attorney's fees. 31 The court further
found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellate attorney's fees without conditioning the fee award on the outcome of the
32
appellate court proceedings.
Although the court found that the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding the discovery abuse sanctions, the court noted that Ford had an
adequate remedy by appeal to remedy such an abuse. 33 Accordingly, the
court denied mandamus relief from the trial court's sanction order. However, the court concluded that appeal was not an adequate remedy when
a court imposes a monetary penalty on a party's prospective exercise of
its legal rights (here, the right to seek mandamus relief). 34 As a result,
the court granted Ford's mandamus petition "as to the unconditional
award of appellate attorney's fees," but denied the petition "in all other
respects. ' 35 Notably, the court in Ford did not grant mandamus in the
interests of judicial economy on those issues for which it found that Ford
36
had an adequate remedy on appeal.
The Corpus Christi and El Paso Courts of Appeals have held that a
party does not have an adequate remedy by appeal to challenge an inter26. 968 S.W.2d at 940.
27. See id. at 942.
28. Id. at 943.
29. See In re Ford Motor Co., No. 97-0430, 1998 WL 387537 (Tex. July 14, 1998) (orig.
proceeding).
30. See id. at *3.
31. See id. at *6.
32. See id.
33. See id. at *8 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(3); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding)).
34. See id. at *9.
35. Id.
36. See id.
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locutory order awarding monetary sanctions for discovery abuse unless
the trial court either: (1) provides that the sanction be payable upon entry
of final order or judgment terminating the litigation or (2) makes express
findings that the sanction award does not threaten the continuation of the
litigation.3 7 In both McCall and Braden, the appellate courts conditionally granted mandamus relief after finding no indication in the record that
the trial court had made any relevant findings related to the effect of the
38
sanction award on the continuation of the litigation.
b.

Discovery Orders

In the case of In re American Optical Corp.,39 the supreme court
granted mandamus relief from a trial court order directing a defendant in
mass tort litigation to produce "virtually every document ever generated
relating to [the defendant's] products, without tying the discovery to the
particular products the plaintiffs claim to have used."'40 The court noted
that "[a]n order compelling discovery that is well outside the proper
bounds is reviewable by mandamus. '4 1 The court concluded that the discovery request in the instant case was overbroad, rendering mandamus
42
appropriate.
Similarly, in ColonialPipeline, a mass tort case involving claims by over
3,000 plaintiffs, 43 the supreme court held that the trial court's order requiring the defendants to create and produce an inventory of all discovery produced by any party in three cases pending in other counties
justified mandamus relief. 44 The court noted that under Rule 166b(2)(b)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] person is not required to produce a document or tangible thing unless it is within the person's possession, custody or control. '45 Because the requested inventory did not
exist, it was not within the defendants' "possession, custody or control. ' 46
The court reasoned that, while plaintiffs might be entitled to any relevant
discovery in related cases "as they are kept in the usual course of business," the trial court could not force the defendants to prepare an inventory of the documents for the plaintiffs. 47 Thus, the court held that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering creation and production of the
37. See In re McCall, 967 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig.
proceeding); In re Braden, 960 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, orig.
proceeding).
38. See McCall, 967 S.W.2d at 940; Braden, 960 S.W.2d at 838. See also In re Barnes,
956 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding) (finding death
penalty sanctions unjust and granting mandamus to remedy the unjust sanctions).
39. No. 97-0872, 1998 WL 352962 (Tex. July 3, 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. at *2 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam)).
42. See id.
43. 968 S.W.2d at 940.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 942 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(b)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(f)).
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inventory.48 The court further concluded that the defendants in Colonial
Pipeline did not have an adequate remedy by appeal because preparation
49
of the inventory would be overly burdensome.
In another discovery mandamus proceeding decided during the Survey
period, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief to
correct a trial court order directing an individual without unique or superior personal knowledge to appear for deposition on behalf of a corporate
defendant.5s 1 The court noted that "no adequate remedy by appeal exists
because an appellate court cannot cure the trial court's error in ordering
'51
an apex deposition.
In an additional discovery order case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief to correct a trial court order imposing a
verification requirement that does not exist under the discovery rules. 5 2
Contrary to Rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial
court in Gist had ordered verification of one party's response to the other
party's requests for production of documents. 53 The court of appeals
conditionally granted mandamus to correct the error without discussing
whether the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy by appeal to correct the
54
trial court's erroneous discovery order.
c.

Order Refusing Supersedeas

In the case of In re Dallas Area Rapid Transit,5 5 the local Dallas newspaper sought disclosure of certain information from the Dallas Area
Rapid Transit Authority (DART) pursuant to the Public Information
Act. 5 6 The trial court ordered production of the requested documents. 57
DART appealed the trial court's order and filed a motion to stay the
production order, "contending that its notice of appeal superseded the
judgment based on Section 452.054(b) of the Transportation Code. '58
The trial court refused to grant a stay regarding the production of documents because it believed that Section 452.054(b) of the Transportation
48. See id.
49. See id. at 942-43(citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843-44 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding)).
50. See In re Daisy Mfg. Co., 976 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998,
orig. proceeding).
51. See id. at 330 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). Accord In re El Paso Healthcare System, 969 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1998, orig. proceeding [mand. granted]). Cf In re Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare,
L.P., 977 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig. proceeding [mand. Denied]) (denying mandamus relief where party being deposed on behalf of corporation
failed to deny his knowledge of relevant facts).
52. See In re Gist, 974 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).
53. See id. at 843.
54. See id.
55. 967 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
56. See id. at 539.
57. See id. at 359.
58. Id.
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Code 59 did not apply to such orders. 60
On mandamus, the supreme court noted that while former Rule 47(f)
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provided the trial court with some
discretion to determine the scope of supersedeas, the rule did not provide
the court with the discretion to deny a party any right to appeal. 6' The
court stated: "To allow a trial court discretion to refuse to supersede a
judgment requiring production of information under the [Public Information] Act is to give that court the power to deny the governmental body
any effective appeal, for once the requested information is produced, an
appeal is moot."' 62 Accordingly, the court held, the trial court erred in
refusing to stay its order requiring production of the requested documents pending appeal. 63 The court further concluded that because the
trial court's refusal to stay production of the documents deprived DART
64
of its right to appeal, DART had no adequate remedy by appeal.
d.

Contempt Orders

Mandamus will issue to correct the premature imposition of fines on
the court clerk. 65 In Long, the Dallas County District Clerk filed a mandamus proceeding seeking relief from a contempt judgment for violation
66
of an order enjoining the clerk from collecting certain filing fees.
Although the court upheld the reasonableness of the injunction and the
contempt order, the court granted mandamus relief because the trial
court abused its discretion by assessing fines against the clerk for actions
67
occurring before the mandate issued.
e.

Orders Regarding Arbitration

Mandamus will issue to correct a trial court's erroneous denial of a
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.68 Reaffirming this general rule and applying a strong presumption against
waiver of a party's right to invoke arbitration, the Texas Supreme Court
granted mandamus in the case of In re Bruce Terminix Co.69 to correct a
59. Section 452.054(b) of the Texas Transportation Code provides in relevant part that
a transportation authority like DART "may not be required to give a supersedeas or cost
bond in an appeal of a judgment." TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 452.054(b) (Vernon 1998).
60. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 967 S.W.2d at 359, 60.
61. See id. at 360.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See In re Long, No. 97-0373, 1999 WL 3761, at *4 (Tex. Jan. 7, 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
66. See id. at *1.
67. See id. Cf.In re Zenergy, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997,
orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus from contempt order assessing both fines and confinement because contempt orders are more appropriately challenged through habeas
corpus).
68. See In re Gardner Zemke Co., 978 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App. -El Paso 1998, orig.
proceeding); In re Foster Mold, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1998, orig.
proceeding).
69. No. 98-0030, 1998 WL 288930 (Tex. June 5, 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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trial court's order finding that a party waived its right to arbitration. 70
Mandamus will further issue to remedy a trial court's failure to permit the
parties to select their own arbitration panel under the Federal Arbitration
71
Act.
f. Severance Orders
In the case of In re El Paso County Hospital District,72 the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in severing
73
portions of the lawsuit after submission of the case to the trier of fact.
The parties, the court of appeals explained, have a "substantial right to a
single judgment and comprehensive appeal of the single complaint,"
which was "seriously" compromised by the trial court's sua sponte election to sever certain parties and claims from the lawsuit. 74 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the severed parties had no adequate remedy by
appeal and were entitled to mandamus relief to correct the trial court's
75
erroneous severance ruling.
g. Order Denying Motion to Abate
Although the denial of a motion to abate a subsequently filed lawsuit
pending the outcome of the first filed lawsuit is not normally reviewable
by mandamus, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in the case of In re
McCaIP6 applied an exception to this general rule where the failure77 to
abate resulted in the two courts taking directly conflicting positions.
h.

Cease and Desist Orders

Mandamus will issue to correct an overly broad cease and desist order
that effectively prohibits an attorney from communicating with his own
70. 1998 WL 288930, at *2. But see Turford v. Underwood, 952 S.W.2d 641,643 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (finding waiver of right to compel
arbitration and conditionally granting writ of mandamus to vacate order compelling
arbitration).
71. See In re Louisiana-Pac. Corp. 972 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
72. 979 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, orig. proceeding).
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id.
75. See id. See also In re Levi Strauss & Co., 959 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. App.-EI Paso
1998, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (finding no adequate remedy by appeal for trial
court's refusal to sever 105 plaintiffs into new and separate causes).
76. 967 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig. proceeding).
77. See id. at 939. See also In re Foremost Ins. Co., 966 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1998, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to correct trial court's
erroneous order denying severance and abatement where such actions were the only
means of prohibiting submission of settlement offers and negotiations into evidence); In re
Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to correct trial court error in denying request
for mandatory abatement under the Residential Construction Liability Act). Compare
Levi, 959 S.W.2d at 705 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, orig. proceeding) (finding no clear
abuse of discretion regarding trial court's failure to abate 105 causes of action pending
resolution of the first five cases to be tried).
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clients.78 In Hall, relator Benjamin Hall was lead attorney in a class action (the Hall Action) similar to the underlying lawsuit (the San Benito
Action). 79 Several of Hall's clients in the Hall Action were also putative
class members in the San Benito Action.80 Hall contacted numerous
plaintiffs (and putative class members) in the San Benito Action and tried
to encourage them not to opt into the class. 8 ' The trial court ordered
Hall to cease and desist any contacts with potential members of the
class.

82

On mandamus, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that taken
to its logical conclusion, the cease and desist prohibited Hall from contacting his own clients in the Hall Action that were putative class members of the other class action.8 3 Under these circumstances, the court of
appeals held that Hall had no adequate remedy by appeal because: (1)
he was not a party to the underlying lawsuit and could not, therefore,
appeal from the trial court's cease and desist order; and (2) as attorney in
the Hall Action for some of the putative class members in the underlying
lawsuit, he "must be able to initiate contact with his clients throughout
the course of the litigation he is retained to pursue." 84 The court of appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to narrowly define the cease and desist order to the
85
instant lawsuit.
i. Order Referring Pretrial Matters to the Master
Consistent with the supreme court's holding in 1991 in Simpson v.
Canales,8 6 the Dallas Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus
relief in the case of In re Sheets,8 7 ordering the trial court to vacate its
order referring all pretrial matters to a master without the consent of all
88
parties to the lawsuit.
j.

Refusal of Assigned Judge to Disqualify Himself

In Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth,89 the supreme court established
that mandamus is the appropriate remedy for an assigned judge's refusal
to disqualify himself after proper objection is made. 90 In the case of In re
Houston Lighting & Power Co.,91 however, the court held that a trial
78. See In re Hall, 972 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig.
proceeding).
79. See id.
80. See id.

81. See id.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id. at 796.
See id.
See id.
806 S.W.2d 802
971 S.W.2d 745
See id. at 748.
943 S.W.2d 436
Id. at 437.
976 S.W.2d 671

(Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, orig. proceeding).
(Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding).
(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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court judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to disqualify himself
after the case was transferred (rather than assigned) to his court.9 2 Accordingly, the court conditionally granted writ of mandamus against the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals ordering the court to vacate its manda93
mus judgment finding to the contrary.
k.

Order Dismissing Case for Want of Prosecution

In the case of In re Ray, 94 the Dallas Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief and ordered a trial court to make findings as to the date upon
which the plaintiff first learned of the dismissal of her case. 95 In Ray, the
trial court signed a written order dismissing the case for want of prosecution on June 25, 1997.96 On August 22, 1997, the relator filed a sworn
motion with the trial court under Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure stating that neither she nor her attorney received notice of the
dismissal order until August 6, 1997. 97 The trial court held a hearing on
relator's motion but failed to enter a finding as to when she and her attorney first received notice or actual knowledge of the court's dismissal order.98 The relator attempted to appeal from the dismissal order, but her
appeal was untimely in the absence of a finding as to when she and her
attorney received actual knowledge of the dismissal. 99 Having no remedy
by appeal, the relator sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals.'1' 0 The Dallas court found that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to make a finding under Rule 306a as to the date the relator and
her attorney first learned of the dismissal order."" Accordingly, the
court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to
enter "an order finding the specific date on which relator or her attorney
10 2
received notice" of the dismissal order.
1. Mandamus of Election Officials
In the case of In re Gibson,10 3 the Waco Court of Appeals reconfirmed
that mandamus is the appropriate mechanism to challenge the validity of
a candidate's application for public office. 104 In Gibson, the democratic
candidate for the office of County Commissioner sought mandamus relief
against the County Republican Party Chair to remove the republican can92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 674.
See id.
967 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 955.
Id. at 952.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 954.
Id.
960 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 421.
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didate for County Commissioner from the ballot. 105 The Waco Court of
Appeals determined that the Republican party candidate had not completed his application to be placed on the Republican Party Primary Election Ballot and accordingly, granted mandamus and ordered the County
Republican Party Chair to remove the improper candidate from the
ballot. 106
m.

Order Granting Bill of Review

The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to correct an erroneously granted bill of review. 10 7 In National Unity, the court reasoned that "[a]n erroneously granted bill of
review is effectively a void order granting a new trial and is an abuse of
discretion that affords no adequate remedy at law."' 10 8
3. Mandamus Relief Denied
a.

Order Denying Recusal Motion

In the case of In re Union Pacific Resources Co.,10 9 the supreme court
cited Rule 18a(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in holding that
mandamus relief is not available to challenge the denial of a motion to
recuse the trial judge. 1 0 The court reasoned that mandamus was not appropriate because Rule 18a(f) affords a party an adequate remedy by appeal from a judgment entered after the erroneous denial of a recusal
motion."1 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Hecht noted that the
court's holding that "appeal affords an adequate remedy for an erroneous
denial of a motion to recuse cannot be without exceptions." 112
b.

Order Consolidating Trials in Mass Tort Litigation

In two cases involving mass tort litigation decided during the Survey
period, the Texas Supreme Court refused to find an abuse of discretion by
the trial court in setting multiple cases for trial simultaneously. 13 The
court held that absent evidence that the proof will differ according to the
various plaintiffs, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by setting
twenty-three out of thousands of breast implant cases for a single trial.' 14
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See In re National Unity Ins. Co., 963 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1998, orig. proceeding).
108. Id. (citing Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam)).
109. 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
110. Id. at 428-29.
111. See id. at 429.
112. Id. at 429 (Hecht, J., concurring).
113. See In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601,605 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
114. See Bristol-Myers, 975 S.W.2d at 605.
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Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration

Although mandamus is generally the appropriate remedy for a trial
court's failure to compel arbitration,' 15 the issue may not be raised prematurely. For example, in the case of In re Valero Energy Corp.,1 6 the
Texas Supreme Court dismissed as premature a mandamus proceeding
arising from a trial court order refusing to compel arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act when the appellate court retained jurisdiction
over the interlocutory appeal under that Act. 117 In Valero, the parties
seeking to compel arbitration filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial
court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration under the Texas
Arbitration Act, as permitted by Section 171.098 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and filed a petition for writ of mandamus to
challenge the refusal under the federal act. 118 The court of appeals retained jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, but denied mandamus
relief.119 Although the supreme court dismissed the mandamus proceeding without prejudice, the court noted that the court of appeals should
have consolidated the two proceedings and disposed of both
simultaneously. 12°
d.

Order Denying Discovery Request

Consistent with supreme court authority denying mandamus relief to
remedy scheduling orders, 12 1 the Texarkana Court of Appeals denied a
petition for writ of mandamus challenging a trial court's order denying a
party's request to conduct additional discovery through newspaper advertisements. 12 2 In Perritt,the court relied upon the trial court's findings of
fact to conclude that the request for additional discovery was an attempt
to gain a continuance from trial rather than an attempt at discovery. 123
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the discovery request. 124
4. Mandamus Sanctions
The new rules of appellate procedure, effective September 1, 1997, provide a mechanism for appellate courts to impose sanctions against attorneys who fail to act in good faith in filing a mandamus petition. 12 5 In the
115. See supra Part I! A(2)(e).
116. 968 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
117. Id. at 917.
118. Id. at 916.
119. See id. at 917.
120. See id.
121. See supra notes 26-28.
122. See In re Perritt, 973 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding).
123. Id.at 781.
124. See id.
125. See TEX. R. App. P. 52.11. Rule 52.11 provides that an attorney fails to act in good
faith by:
(a) filing a petition that is clearly groundless;
(b) bringing the petition solely for delay of an underlying proceeding;
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case of In re Cotton,126 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals imposed
sanctions after finding that the relators' attorney violated almost every
aspect of Rule 52.11, including filing a groundless petition, grossly misstating or omitting obviously important and material facts and filing a
misleading appendix. 127
In that case, the relators filed a petition for writ of mandamus on December 10, 1997, seeking to unseal certain records.2 8 In a lengthy response, the real party-in-interest advised the court that by the time the
relators had filed their mandamus petition, the parties had signed an
agreement to settle all of the claims in the lawsuit. 129 The settlement was
then presented to the trial court the following day and the case was dismissed with prejudice. 13 1 On December 22, 1997, the parties signed a
formal settlement agreement and the relators accepted $60,000 in full settlement of their claims. 13' The relators never advised the court of appeals
132
of the settlement or the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit.
After a show cause hearing, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found
that the relators' mandamus petition was groundless because the dismissal of the lawsuit resulted in a "final appealable order" that rendered
mandamus unnecessary. 133 Moreover, the settlement agreement rendered moot "the relators' need for the records at issue because there was
no longer any controversy. 1 34 The court further found that by failing to
disclose all facts surrounding the sealed records (including the fact that
the trial court had already conducted a hearing related to the sealed documents and had indicated that it would permit the relators to have access
to the sealed records if their request were more specific) and by failing to
disclose the settlement and dismissal of the lawsuit, the relators' counsel
"filed a petition in this Court that grossly misstates or omits obviously
important material facts. 1 35 The court found further that the relators'
counsel filed a misleading appendix and record by submitting only portions of two Reporter's Records after renumbering the pages to create
the appearance of a complete record. 136 Despite the apparent egregious
conduct of the relators' counsel, however, the court generously limited its
sanction to $5,000.137
(c) grossly misstating or omitting an obviously important and material fact in
the petition or response; or
(d) filing an appendix or record that is clearly misleading because of the
omission of obviously important and material evidence or documents.
Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

972 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Id. at 770.
See id. at 768.
See id.
See id. at 768-69.
See id. at 769.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 770.
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In the case of In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 138 the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals also invoked Rule 52.11 and ordered the relators to show
cause why the court should not issue sanctions against them for failing to
cite controlling contrary authority that rendered their mandamus petition
39
groundless.'
5. Mandamus Practice
a. Mandamusing Oral Rulings of the Trial Court
In Perritt, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that, unlike the old
rules of appellate procedure, the new rules of appellate procedure permit
a party to seek mandamus relief from an oral ruling of the trial court if
40
the ruling is adequately shown by the reporter's record.
b.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Multiple mandamus filings in the court of appeals may result in referral
of the case to mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution rather than mandamus relief.14 1 In Jensen, the Waco Court of Appeals stayed all proceedings, including the mandamus proceeding, and
ordered mediation of the pending lawsuit pursuant to Section 154.002 of
142
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
B.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

1. Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal
Under recently enacted Section 51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)
"shall have the effect of staying the commencement of a trial in the trial
court pending resolution of the appeal." 143 Despite the broad language
of this statute requiring a stay of "commencement of a trial" while the
interlocutory appeal is pending, at least one court of appeals has refused
to interpret the statute as requiring the issuance of an order staying all
144
proceedings in the court below.
Specifically, in Gragg, the defendant appealed the trial court's interlocutory order denying the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction based on the
defense of sovereign immunity, which the defendant had asserted against
some of the plaintiffs' claims.1 45 On appeal, the defendant sought an order from the Waco Court of Appeals staying the trial in the lower court
138. 960 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding).
139. Id. at 273-74.
140. See In re Perritt, 973 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding). CompareTEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(2)(C) (repealed) with TEX. R. App. P. 52.3(j)(1)(A).
141. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 966 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, orig. proceeding)
(per curiam).
142. See id. at 851.
143. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
144. See Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Gragg, 962 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Waco
1998, order) (per curiam).
145. See id. at 718.
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pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. 146 Noting that the plaintiff had claims, such as inverse condemnation, pending in the court below
that were not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity, the court of
appeals stated that it was reluctant to issue an order staying all proceedings in the trial court.' 47 Accordingly, the Waco court interpreted section
51.014(b) as requiring only a stay of "any part of the proceeding that may
be affected by our decision in the interlocutory appeal," and stayed trial
only on any claim against which the defendant had asserted the defense
of sovereign immunity prior to perfecting the interlocutory appeal. 148
The court of appeals refused to stay trial on all claims in the trial court,
expressly stating that the trial court was free to proceed with a trial of the
claims of inverse condemnation, provided that all claims stayed by the
9
court of appeals' order had been non-suited or severed.1 4
2. Appeals From ParticularOrders
a. Appeal From Order on Motion to Transfer Venue and/or Order
Granting/Denying Joinder or Intervention When Venue is
a Factor
An order on a motion to transfer venue is by rule and statute not generally an appealable order.'5 0 As held by the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Shubert v. J.C. Penney Co.,151 section 15.003 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code does not change this fact. 152
Section 15.003 permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting
or denying joinder or intervention by plaintiffs in which venue is the factor by which the trial court decides whether to permit joinder or intervention. 15 3 Despite the fact that a court of appeals' review of a trial court's
ruling on the propriety of an intervention or joinder will "necessarily require the appellate court to determine the underlying venue question," an
interlocutory appeal is only permitted from "an order granting or denying
joinder/intervention and not from an order transferring venue. '154 This
conclusion is supported by the fact that a construction of section 15.003 as
permitting an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's venue determination
would provide an opposite result from the clear language of Rule 87(6) of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and section 15.064(a) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which both expressly forbid an inter146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See
See
Id.
See
See

id.
id. at 719.

id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(6) ("There shall be no interlocutory appeals from [venue]
determination."); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986) ("No
interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [venue] determination.").
151. 956 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
152. See id. at 635-36.
153. See id. at 635.
154. See id. at 636.
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locutory appeal from a venue determination.1 55
A defendant, however, may not defeat a plaintiff's right to interlocutory appeal by the label given to his motion. Accordingly, even if a motion is labeled "motion to transfer venue," an interlocutory appeal will lie
if the trial court's venue decision necessarily rests on whether a person,
who was unable to independently establish venue, properly established
joinder under section 15.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. 156
b.

Appeal From Order Allowing or Denying Intervention

Although section 15.003(c) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
clearly allows an interlocutory appeal to contest the trial court's decision
to allow a party to intervene or the trial court's decision precluding a
party from intervening, the enactment clause of chapter 15 provides that
"this Act applies only to a suit commenced on or after September 1,
1995." 157 Faced with the assertion that the term "suit" used in the enactment clause refers to the plea in intervention rather than the pending lawsuit, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded in Jani-King of
Memphis, Inc. v. Yates 158 that the "suit" to which the enactment clause
refers is the original lawsuit filed against the defendant, not the plea in
intervention. 159 The Jani-King court thus concluded that "section
15.003(c) allows an interlocutory appeal to challenge the decision of the
trial court allowing or denying intervention only when the underlying
lawsuit was filed after September 1, 1995."' 6
c.

Appeal From Order Denying Special Appearance

In 1997, the Texas Legislature amended section 51.014 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code to allow an interlocutory appeal of a denial
of a special appearance.' 6 ' The new law was to be applied retroactively
155. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(6); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a)
(Vernon 1986). See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Barner, 964 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (refusing to address appellants' point of error contesting a decision regarding transfer of venue).
156. See Abel v. Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d 30, 36, (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet.
granted). See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 957 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider ruling
on motion to transfer venue challenging legality of joinder); Barner, 964 S.W.2d at 301
(court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider joinder issue raised in motion to transfer
venue and for severance which questioned propriety of joinder); Surgitek, Inc. v. Adams,
955 S.W.2d 884, 887-88 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. requested) (interlocutory
appeal is available to review trial court's implicit findings that plaintiffs failed to independently establish venue under section 15.003(a)).
157. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c) historical note (Vernon Supp.
1997).
158. 965 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
159. See id. at 668.
160. See id. (emphasis added).
161. Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1296, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937
(Vernon) (codified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
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to causes commenced prior to its June 20, 1997 effective date but which
had not gone to trial before that date. 162 Relying on "a plain reading of
the statute," the Waco Court of Appeals in Allied Erectors Corp. v. Barbara's Bakery163 held that section 51.014 allows an appeal of an order
denying special appearance signed over three years before the law's effective date. 164 Accordingly, the court in Allied Erectors Corp. granted the
appellant's motion to extend the time to perfect the appeal from the
three-year-old order denying special appearance, holding that the time
periods "[t]hereafter" would be governed by the Rules of Appellate
65
Procedure.
Disagreeing with the Texarkana court's conclusion in Allied Erectors
Corp., the Amarillo Court of Appeals held in Iron Mountain Bison
Ranch, Inc. v. Easley TrailerMfg., Inc.1 66 that the applicability of section
51.014 to pending cases in which there is not an ongoing trial, retrial, or
appeal, does not impact the time period within which an appeal governed
by that statute must be perfected under the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 167 The Amarillo court concluded that, regardless of the retroactive applicability of the new statute, appeals from interlocutory orders
granting or denying special appearances must be perfected "within 20
days after the judgment or order is signed," as required by the Texas
168
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
d.

Appeal from Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
an Assertion of Immunity

Section 51.014(a)(5) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits
an interlocutory appeal from the denial of "a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an
1 69
officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state."'
In the past, this statute has been interpreted to permit appellate interlocutory review of the denial of a summary judgment motion based only on
162. Id. at ch. 1296, § 2.
163. 954 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, order).
164. See id. at 197-98.
165. Id. at 198.
166. 964 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet. h.).
167. See id. at 763.
168. Id. As discussed by the Iron Mountain court, under Rule 28.1 of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the interlocutory appeal of matters contemplated by section
51.014(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is considered an accelerated appeal.
See 964 S.W.2d at 763; TEX. R. App. P. 28.1; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.014(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1998). Under Rule 26.1(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal must be filed "within 20 days after the judgment
or order is signed." Iron Mountain, 964 S.W.2d at 763; TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b). Accordingly, an appeal from an order granting or denying a special appearance must be filed
within 20 days of the date the order is signed. Iron Mountain, 964 S.W.2d at 763. Presumably, however, a party appealing such an order could obtain a 15-day extension for filing its
notice of appeal under Rule 26.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, as the Notes
and Comments to Rule 26.3 state "An extension of time is available for all appeals." TEX.
R. App. P. 26.3 cmt.
169. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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assertions of the state common-law defense of official immunity.1 70 However, in Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel,1 71 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that section 51.014(5) also allows an interlocutory appeal from
the denial of a summary judgment motion based on a qualified immunity
defense to a federal section 1983 action. 172 In reaching this conclusion,
the Bexar County court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Newman v. Obersteller,173 in which the supreme court held that section
51.014(5) [now section 51.014(a)(5)] allows an interlocutory appeal from
the denial of a summary judgment motion based on section 101.106 of the
Texas Tort Claims Act. 174 Under Newman's broadened construction of
the statute, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held, interlocutory appeals
under section 51.014(5) are not limited to assertions of state common-law
official immunity. 175

After determining that the denial of a motion for summary judgment
based on an assertion of qualified immunity fit within section 51.014(5),
the Bexar County court evaluated its jurisdiction to consider fact-based
aspects of a qualified immunity defense. 176 The appellee argued that, as
in federal court, fact-related, evidence sufficiency aspects of a qualified
immunity defense may not properly be considered on interlocutory appeal. 177 Rejecting this argument, the Bexar County court concluded that
the considerations of federal appellate procedure upon which the federal
limitation is based are not applicable in the state court context, given the
express legislative enactment providing for an interlocutory appeal from
the denial of summary judgment based on immunity, and the absence of a
178
comparable statute applicable in federal court.
e.

Appeal from Class Certification Order

The jurisdiction of a court of appeals over an appeal from an interlocutory order "exists only insofar as it is specifically authorized by stat170. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Tanner, 928 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, no writ) (holding that in an appeal under section 51.014(5) [now section
51.014(a)(5)], courts of appeals may only consider arguments based on the state commonlaw defense of official immunity). The language of section 51.014(5) and its successorsection 51.014(a)(5)-is identical. Compare TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(5) (Vernon 1997) with TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1998).
171. 956 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
172. See id. at 694.
173. 960 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1997).
174. Id. at 622.
175. See Bexar County, 956 S.W.2d at 694. The San Antonio court further noted that
other courts of appeals have held that section 51.014(5) allows an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. See id. (citing City of Harlingen v. Vega, 951 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no
writ); Hudson v. Vasquez, 941 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ);
Spacek v. Charles, 928 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd

w.o.j.).
176. See 956 S.W.2d at 695-96.
177. See id. at 696 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817
(1985)).
178. See id.
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ute." 179 According to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, in the class
certification context, this means the court of appeals has jurisdiction over
all matters which pertain to the certification decided by an interlocutory
order. 180 In the Rio Grande case, this included a determination of
whether the judge that originally entered the certification order was subsequently recused rather than disqualified.' 81 In that case, the court of
appeals found it necessary to determine whether the order before it was
entered by a court without jurisdiction due to a disqualifying interest.1 8 2
The court carefully pointed out, however, that, in the interlocutory appeal, it did not have jurisdiction to review, and therefore was not reviewing, the propriety of the lower court's ruling on the motion to recuse. 183
f. Appeal from Interlocutory Order Failing to Dispose of all Issues
Under Rule 27.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a court of
appeals may "allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so
as to be made final and may allow the modified order and all proceedings
relating to it to be included in a supplemental record." 184 Instead of dismissing for want of jurisdiction an unappealable interlocutory summary
judgment order that left unresolved the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys'
fees, the First Court of Appeals invoked its authority under this rule,
abated the premature appeal, and ordered the parties to coordinate a
hearing on fees in the trial court within forty-five days of the abatement
order. 18 5 As permitted by Rule 27.2, the court of appeals concluded that
the appeal would be reinstated on its active docket upon the filing of a
supplemental clerk's record containing a signed, final judgment from the
trial court disposing of the attorney's fees issue. 186
g. Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Appeals
As confirmed by the supreme court in Gross v. Innes,187 and Coastal
Corp. v. Garza,188 the Texas Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appealable interlocutory orders only when "the justices of the courts of appeals
disagree on a question of law material to the decision or [when] the
courts of appeals hold differently from a prior decision of another court
of appeals or of the supreme court."' 189 In other words, the supreme
179. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism'd w.o.).
180. See id. See also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1998).
181. See 962 S.W.2d at 637-38.
182. See id. at 638.
183. See id. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f).
184. TEX. R. App. P. 27.2.

185. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leeds, 981 S.W.2d 693, 693-94 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
186. See id. at 694.
187. No. 96-1095, 1998 WL 387516 (Tex. July 14, 1998).
188. 979 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1998).
189. Gross 1998 WL 387516, at *1; see also Coastal Corp., 979 S.W.2d at 319 (citing
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(c)).
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court can exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from an appealable inter190
locutory order "only when there is a dissent or a conflict.'
For the supreme court to have "conflicts" jurisdiction, "it must appear
that the rulings in the two cases are so far upon the same state of facts
that the decision of one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in
the other." 19 1 This standard, however, does not require factual identity
for two cases to conflict.' 9 2 Indeed, "[a] conflict could arise on very different underlying facts if those facts are not important to the legal princi93
ple being announced."'
III.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A.

CHARGE ERROR

1. Failure to Obtain Endorsement
Under Rule 276 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, when "an instruction, question, or definition is requested ...

and the judge refuses

same, the judge shall endorse thereon 'Refused,' and sign the same officially."' 194 In Dallas Market Center Development Co. v. Liedeker, 95 the
Texas Supreme Court stated conclusively that a Rule 276 endorsement of
a refused jury charge request "is not the exclusive means of preserving
error for refusing a charge request."' 19 6 Instead, the court held, Rule 276
allows for preservation of error by other means. 197 In Liedeker, the
"other means" consisted of the trial court's admission on the record that
he had "considered the requested [jury] question, had refused it, and had
198
meant to endorse it but simply failed to do so, for which he was sorry."
Disapproving of the court of appeals' opinions suggesting that endorsement is the only method of preserving error, the supreme court noted
that making endorsement the exclusive means of preserving error for refusing a charge request when the court's refusal is otherwise clear from
the record "would promote form over substance and be ill advised."' 199
As demonstrated by the facts of Liedeker, in which the trial court promised to endorse the refused charge request and then failed to do so, the
court explained that "[a] lawyer has no practical way of ensuring that a
trial court will actually endorse charge requests as promised .... ,,200
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Gross, 1998 WL 387516, at *1.
Id.
See id.
Id.
TEX. R. Cv. P. 276.
958 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1997).
Id. at 386.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Failure to Make Objection
Even "glaring omissions" in the charge must be objected to or they are
waived on appeal. For example, although the damage question in the
charge to the jury in Housing Authority v. Guerra20 1 contained no guidance on what elements-loss of earning capacity, loss of income, physical pain, impairment, mental anguish-the jury should have considered in
arriving at an amount payable as actual damages, neither party objected
to the question as submitted, and no complaint as to the form of the question was raised on appeal. 20 2 Accordingly, any complaint as to the mea20 3
sure of damages used by the jury was waived.
Similarly, as held by the Texas Supreme Court in Kolster v. City of El
Paso,20 4 a trial court's erroneous determination of the standard of care is
waived on appeal if the appellant fails to object to the jury charge on the
ground that it submits the wrong standard. 20 5 In Kolster, the trial court
erroneously concluded that the standard for determining the culpability
of a municipal employee's acts in operating an emergency vehicle in an
emergency situation is negligence.2 0 6 In fact, as the supreme court held in
City of Amarillo v. Martin,2 0 7 to recover damages resulting from the
emergency operation of an emergency vehicle, "a plaintiff must show that
the operator has committed an act that the operator knew or should have
known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury-in other words, that
the operator has acted recklessly. ' 20 8 Negligence is not the standard for
determining liability in this context. Unlike the City of Amarillo in Martin, however, the City of El Paso in Kolster did not object to the jury
20 9
charge on the grounds that negligence was not the correct standard.
Accordingly, the trial court's error in that regard was waived, and the
supreme court was bound to review the culpability of the employee under
210
the standard submitted to the jury-simple negligence.
As demonstrated by the defendant in Waite Hill Services, Inc. v. World
Class Metal Works, Inc.,211 to preserve error on the issue of a double
201. 963 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied).
202. See id. at 951.
203. See id.
204. 972 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. 1998).
205. See id. at 59.
206. See id.
207. 971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998).
208. Kolster, 972 S.W.2d at 59. See Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 430.
209. See Kolster, 972 S.W.2d at 59.
210. See id. Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, dissented, disagreeing with the Majority's position that the heightened liability standard set forth in Martin had been waived
by the City of El Paso. See Kolster, 972 S.W.2d at 60-61 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Justice
Hecht pointed to the numerous instances in which the City of El Paso had asserted in the
courts below that the standard for measuring the employee's culpability was whether the
employee operated the ambulance "without due regard for others' safety." Id. Justice
Hecht concluded that, notwithstanding the language of the charge and the jury's finding of
negligence, the City of El Paso should not have been held liable to the plaintiff unless the
employee acted either with reckless disregard or without due regard for others' safety. See
id.
211. 959 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
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recovery of actual damages, a defendant need only request, before judgment, that the trial court require the plaintiff to elect a remedy. 212 The
defendant is not required to object to the submission of more than one
acceptable measure of damages to preserve error. 2 13 Indeed, such an objection would be improper. Although a plaintiff may not obtain more
than one recovery for the same injury, he is generally entitled to sue and
214
to seek damages on alternative theories.
Rule 274 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party's
objection to the jury charge "must point out distinctly the objectionable
matter and the grounds of the objection" and that any complaint to the
charge "is waived unless specifically included in the objections. ' 215 As
the Eastland Court of Appeals reaffirmed during the survey period,
under Rule 274, the complaint must be urged prior to the submission of
2 16
the court's charge to the jury.
B.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY POINTS

A party that moves for judgment on the jury's verdict is prohibited
from taking a position inconsistent with the verdict on appeal insofar as
factual sufficiency is concerned. 2 17 Specifically, a party who asks the trial
court to render judgment in accordance with the jury verdict for the
amount of damages the jury found, waives error on his challenge to the
factual sufficiency of the verdict. 2 18 As instructed by the supreme court

in FirstNational Bank of Beeville v. Fojtik,219 a party moving to accept a
judgment must reserve the right to complain of the judgment on appeal
by accepting only the form of the judgment or only that part of the judg220
ment he finds acceptable.
22
1
In Ramirez v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
well-established rules regarding preservation of legal and factual suffi212. See id. at 184.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
216. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie, 979 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1998, orig. proceeding).
217. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Tex. 1984); see
also Byrd v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998,
no pet. h.).
218. See Byrd, 976 S.W.2d at 259. Although the Amarillo court in Byrd held that an
unqualified motion for judgment waives challenges to the factual sufficiency of the verdict,
at least one other court of appeals (the First Court of Appeals) has held that such a motion

waives all points of error, not just sufficiency of the evidence complaints. See Casu v.
Marathon Ref. Co., 896 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ
denied).
219. 775 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam).
220. See Byrd, 976 S.W.2d at 259; see also Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d at 633. A party who
merely indicates that he does not oppose the form of the other party's proposed judgment
does not waive his factual sufficiency points. See Morse v. Delgado, 975 S.W.2d 378, 381

(Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet. h.). Waiver will result, however, if the party approves the
opposing party's proposed judgment "as to form and substance." See id. (emphasis added).
221. 973 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet. h.).
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ciency complaints. To complain of factual insufficiency of the evidence to
support a jury finding and to complain that a jury finding is against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence, a point in a motion for
new trial is a prerequisite. 222 Further, while the rules of civil procedure
do not expressly require a motion for new trial to complain of legal sufficiency in a jury trial, if the error has not been otherwise preserved, it must
be so raised or it is waived on appeal. 223 As a prerequisite to a "no evidence" point on appeal, "an appellant must have presented the complaint
to the trial court by motion for instructed verdict, objection to the submission of the jury question, motion for judgment non obstante veredicto,
motion to disregard the contested jury finding, or a motion for new
22 4
trial.,
C.

JUROR DISQUALIFICATION

When a trial court refuses to disqualify a juror for bias or prejudice, the
complaining party must show that the error was harmful. To do this, the
party, before exercising its peremptory challenges, must advise the trial
court that the court's denial of the challenges for cause would force the
party to exhaust its peremptory challenges and, that after exercising its
peremptory challenges, specific objectionable jurors would still remain on
the panel. 225 In other words, harm occurs only if the party uses all of his
peremptory challenges and, as a result, is prevented from striking other
objectionable jurors from the list because he has no remaining peremptory challenges. 226 Failure to notify the trial court of these facts "constitutes a waiver of the right to complain of the trial court's refusal to
discharge a juror challenged for cause." 227
D.

SANCTIONS ORDERS

A trial court levying sanctions under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure is required to specify in its sanctions order the acts or
basis for the award. 228 The language of Rule 13 is mandatory and a trial
court's failure to comply constitutes an abuse of discretion. 229 Nonetheless, a trial court's failure to specify the acts or basis for the sanction cannot be raised on appeal unless the complaining party objects to the form
222. See id. at 390; TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2) & (3).
223. See id.

224. Id. (citing Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.
1987)).
225. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 34 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Goode v.
Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 452 (Tex. 1997)).
226. See Hallett v. Houston N.W. Med. Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985).
227. Lucas v. Titus County Hosp. Dist./Titus Mem'l Hosp., 964 S.W.2d 144, 158 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied). In Lucas, the record did not reflect that the plaintiffs
had used all of their peremptory challenges or that they notified the trial court that they
used all their peremptory challenges. See id. As a result, the plaintiffs failed to properly
object to the trial court's failure to strike the juror for cause, and waived any error. See id.
228.

See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.

229. See Tarrant County v. Chancey, 942 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997,
no writ).
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of the sanctions order in the trial court. 23 °
E.

DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE

To complain on appeal of a trial court's refusal to grant a continuance
because a party is unable to be present at trial, the absent party must
demonstrate to the trial court that (1) he had a reasonable excuse for his
231
absence and (2) he was prejudiced by the trial proceeding without him.
The absent party's testimony must be material. 232 A motion for continuance stating merely that the party "would give vital testimony at the trial"
without explaining the substance of the testimony is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the testimony is material or that he would be prejudiced
233
by the trial proceeding without him.
Similarly, to complain on appeal of the lack of adequate time to prepare for trial, a party must present a written motion for continuance, supported by affidavits, and object on the record to the lack of an
opportunity to present evidence resulting from inadequate time to pre234
pare for trial.
F.

COMPLAINTS RAISED BY CROSS POINT

By cross point on appeal, a party who has secured a judgment n.o.v. at
trial is permitted to raise issues or points that would have vitiated the
verdict or that would have prevented an affirmance of the judgment if the
trial court had rendered judgment on the verdict. 235 The fact, however,
that a party is permitted to raise such issues by cross point on appeal does
not eliminate the basic requirement that a trial court be given the opportunity to cure any error before appeal is sought. 236 Consequently, a party
who accepts a judgment n.o.v. without objecting to the jury's findings,
waives his complaint that a particular jury finding is not supported by
237
legally or factually sufficient evidence.
G.

OBLIGATION TO LODGE OBJECTIONS BASED ON CASE LAW NOT

YET ISSUED

The fact that a particular proposition is not yet law at the time a trial
court commits error does not relieve a party of its obligation to lodge
230. See Alexander v. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
231. See Richards v. Schion, 969 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
no pet. h.).
232. See id; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 252 ("If the ground [for a continuance] be for the
absence of a witness, [the movant] shall state what he expects to prove by him.").
233. Richards, 969 S.W.2d at 132-33.
234. See In re J. (B.B.) M., 955 S.W.2d 405, 407-10 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no
pet.).
235. See TEX. R. App. P. 38.2(b)(1). In fact, the language of Rule 38.2(b) is
mandatory-a party must raise such issues or points or those complaints are waived in the
event the judgment n.o.v. is reversed on appeal. Id.
236. See Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. National Union First Ins. Co., 966 S.W.2d 559, 571 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(c); TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
237. See Rocor, 966 S.W.2d at 571.
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timely objections to preserve error. For example, the fact that Elbaor v.
Smith2 38 (which prohibits Mary Carter agreements) had not yet been decided until after the verdict was returned (but before judgment was rendered) in St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co., Inc. v. Dal-Worth Tank
Co., Inc. 2 39 did not excuse the defendant's failure to object prior to judgment to a Mary Carter agreement entered into by other parties in the
case. 24° Even though Elbaorwas not yet law, the supreme court held, the
defendant was obliged to lodge a timely objection to preserve error.2 4 1
Further, in Rocor International,Inc. v. National Union First Insurance
Co.,242 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the defendant had
waived its factual sufficiency complaint with respect to the jury's findings
on attorneys' fees because it had accepted the trial court's judgment
n.o.v. without objecting to the jury's finding on fees even though, at the
time the trial court entered judgment, the legal basis for the defendant's
complaint as to fees did not exist.243 Although preservation would have
been impossible because the case supporting the defendant's cross point
was issued after the trial court entered judgment, the Rocor court of appeals refused to consider the cross point on fees, concluding that "the
finality of judicial decisions would be seriously undermined if litigants
were allowed to raise unpreserved error on appeal on the basis of new
case law."'244
IV.

JUDGMENTS

Together, the supreme court's decisions in Mafrige v. Ross 24 5 and Inglish v. Union State Bank246 create an exception to the well-established
rule that, to be a "final" judgment subject to appeal, a judgment must
dispose of all parties and all issues. 247 Under this exception, finality is
afforded to "judgments which, though not actually disposing of all parties
'248
and issues, appear to do just that.
As the appellant in Pena learned the hard way, there can only be one
final judgment in a lawsuit and, if that "final judgment" is a summary
judgment that contains Mother Hubbard language purporting to dispose
of all parties and issues, the appellant must either ask the trial court, during its plenary power, to correct the summary judgment to omit the
Mother Hubbard language or perfect a timely appeal of that judgment. 249
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

845
974
See
See
966
See

244. Id.

S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1992).
S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
id. at 53.
id.
S.W.2d 559, 571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.)
id.

245. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
246. 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997).
247. See Pena v. Valley Sandia, Ltd., 964 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1998, no pet.).
248. Id. (emphasis in original).
249. See id.
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If he does neither, the court of appeals will be without jurisdiction to
250
decide the merits of the appeal.
Similarly, if it disposes of all issues and parties, a trial court's order
granting a motion for summary judgment pursuant to a master's recommendation is final and appealable, even if the trial court has been requested to conduct a new hearing on the motion and fails to do so before
signing the order. 25' When a matter is decided by a special master, any
party who invokes his right by filing a request, is entitled to a hearing
before the judge of the referring court on the master's ruling. Nonetheless, the district court's failure to hold such a hearing prior to signing a
judgment does not render the judgment void and, if it disposes of all issues and parties, the failure to timely appeal from such a judgment cre252
ates a jurisdictional defect in the appeal.
V. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In Nuchia v. Woodruff,2 53 the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held (on
rehearing) that, under Rule 306c of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 58(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a prematurely
filed motion for new trial that "assails" and "can properly be applied" to
a subsequently signed judgment operates to extend the appellate timetable.254 Acknowledging that the supreme court's opinion in FredoniaState
Bank v. GeneralAmerican Life Insurance Co.,255 in which the court held
that a prematurely filed motion for new trial operated as a preservation
document with respect to a subsequently signed judgment, did not resolve
the issue of whether such a motion also operates to extend the appellate
timetable, the Nuchia court found no reason to draw a distinction between preservation and extension of the appellate timetable, and concluded that a prematurely filed motion for new trial that assails a
subsequently signed judgment operates to extend the appellate timetable. 256 In support of this conclusion, the Fourteenth court considered the
policy that "the Rules of Appellate Procedure ...should not be read to

defeat the right to appeal except when such a construction is absolutely
250. See id. (quoting Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811).
251. See Wilson v. Kutler, 971 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
252. See id.
253. 956 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (on
rehearing).
254. Id. at 613-14. Rule 306c provides that "no motion for new trial ... shall be held
ineffective because prematurely filed; but every such motion shall be deemed to have been
filed on the date of but subsequent to the time of the signing of the judgment the motion
assails .... TEX. R. Cirv. P. 306c. Under Rule 58(a), "proceedings relating to an appeal
need not be considered ineffective because of prematurity if a subsequent appealable order
has been signed to which the premature proceeding may properly be applied." TEX. R.
App. P. 58(a). The "proceedings relating to an appeal" referred to in this rule include
motions for new trial. Nuchia, 956 S.W.2d at 614 (citing Harris County Hosp. Dist. v.
Estrada, 831 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
255. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
256. See Nuchia, 956 S.W.2d at 614.
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necessary ....,,257
B.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO

A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto can properly be filed
before or after judgment and still preserve error. 258 Historically, however, it did not operate to extend the appellate timetable, regardless of
when it was filed. 259 To obtain an extended appellate timetable, a motion
260
for new trial had to be timely filed.
In 1981, however, the Texas Supreme Court amended Rule 329b to
provide for an extended appellate timetable if either a motion for new
trial or a "motion to vacate, modify, correct, or reform" a judgment was
filed within thirty days of judgment. 2 61 Still, though, the amended rule
made no provision for an extended appellate timetable based on a motion
for judgment n.o.v. or a motion to disregard jury findings filed within
thirty days of judgment. 262 These types of motions, it appeared, continued to be governed solely by Rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil
263
Procedure.
Then, in 1995, the Texas Supreme Court held in Gomez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice264 that a motion filed within thirty days of
judgment labeled "bill of review" that assailed the trial court's judgment
extended the appellate timetable on the basis of the timely filed "bill of
review. '2 65 In the wake of Gomez, "the filing of any postjudgment motion or other instrument that (1) is filed within the time for filing a motion for a new trial and (2) assails the trial court's judgment extends the
appellate timetable. '2 66 As a result, a judgment non obstante veredicto
that assails the trial court's judgment and is filed within the time period
267
for filing a motion for new trial extends the appellate timetable.
C.

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Under Rule 329b(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "a motion
to modify, correct, or reform a judgment ..

.,

if filed, shall be filed and

determined within the time prescribed by this rule for a motion for new
257. Id. (citing Fredonia,881 S.W.2d at 282).
258. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; see also Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.) ("Rule 301 provides for a motion for judgment non
obstante veredicto but neither that rule nor any other 'provides a time limit for its
filing."').
259. See Kirschberg, 974 S.W.2d at 846 (citing Walker v. S & T Truck Lines, Inc., 409
S.W.2d 942, 944-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd)).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 846-47.
263. See id. This is so despite the similarities between the motion to vacate, modify,
correct, or reform, and the motion for judgment n.o.v. and motion to disregard jury findings. Id.
264. 896 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
265. See id. at 176-77.
266. Kirschberg, 974 S.W.2d at 847-48.
267. See id.
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trial and shall extend the trial court's plenary power and the time '2for
68
perfecting an appeal in the same manner as a motion for new trial.
Can a motion for sanctions filed within thirty days of the signing of a final
judgment constitute a "motion to modify or reform" under Rule 329b(g)?
Yes, according to the First Court of Appeals' holding in Lane Bank
Equipment Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc. 269 In Lane Bank, the
trial court entered a final judgment27 0 on June 5, 1997.271 On June 26,
1997, the defendant filed a motion for sanctions, requesting an award of
more than $40,000 in attorney's fees and expenses. 272 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for sanctions on July 11, 1997.273 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court's plenary power had expired
thirty days after the June 5, 1997 judgment was signed, which was before
2 74
the motion for sanctions was granted.
The First Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiff. The First court
held that the defendant's June 26, 1997 motion for sanctions was a motion
to modify or reform the judgment, because under Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 329b(g) it "requested a substantive change in the judgment, an
award of more than $40,000 in attorney's fees and expenses. ' 275 As a
result, the motion for sanctions "extended the trial court's plenary
power. "276

Notably, in Lane Bank, the First Court of Appeals acknowledged that
in Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider,277 the Texas Supreme
Court specifically approved that portion of the Waco Court of Appeals'
opinion in Hjalmarson v. Langley278 holding that a sanctions order was
void because the trial court's plenary power had expired before it was
signed, where the motion for sanctions was filed nine days after judgment
and the sanctions order was signed forty days after judgment. 279 The
First Court of Appeals, however, determined that the holding in
Schexnider was on a different basis, and the opinion never specifically
268. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(g).
269. No. 01-97-01032-CV, 1998 WL 418125 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 23,
1998, pet. filed).
270. The parties in the case apparently disputed whether the summary judgment order
entered on June 5, 1997 disposed of all parties and issues. See id. at *1. For purposes of the
court of appeals' analysis as to the trial court's plenary power, however, the court of appeals assumed the June 5, 1997 order constituted a final judgment. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See Lane Bank, 1998 WL 418125, at *1.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 940 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. 1996).
278. 840 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
279. Lane Bank, 1998 WL 418125, at *1-*2; Hjalmarson,840 S.W.2d at 156; Schexnider,

940 S.W.2d at 596. In Schexnider, the supreme court stated, "Although the defendant filed
the [sanctions] motion while the trial court had plenary jurisdiction, the trial court did not
sign the order purporting to grant the motion until after the court's jurisdiction had expired ....
[Tihe court in Hjalmarson correctly concluded that the trial court could not
grant the motion after its plenary jurisdiction had expired .. " Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d at
596.
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discussed "whether a timely filed sanctions motion extends a trial court's
plenary power. '280 The court accordingly concluded "that Schexnider is
not controlling," and declined to follow Hjalmarson.28 1
D.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

An appellant's failure to file and serve a "Notice of Past Due Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law" waives his right to complain on appeal
of any error related to the trial court's failure to make a finding or conclusion. 282 According to the Corpus Christ Court of Appeals in Salinas,
this is so, even if findings of fact are set forth in the trial court's judgment.
Findings, the Salinas court held, "do not belong in the judgment" and
"may not be considered on appeal. '2 83
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Seerden disagreed with the majority's conclusion that findings contained in the judgment can never be
considered on appeal.2 84 He stated that, according to the language of
Rule 299a, the court of appeals "may consider findings within the body of
the judgment, even if those findings are not in compliance with Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 299a, so long as they are not in conflict with
separately-filed findings that are in compliance with the rules. '2 85 He
pointed out that Rule 299a is not entirely silent on the effect of findings
contained in the judgment, but provides only that such findings "are invalid in case of conflict with properly-filed findings. '2 86 "If findings incorrectly included in the judgment were to be treated as a nullity," he
concluded, "Rule 299a could easily have stated that. It does not. '2 87 As
noted by the majority and concurring opinions in Salinas, there is a split
in the courts of appeals on this issue. 288
280. 1998 WL 418125, at *2.
281. Id.
282. See Salinas v. Beaudrie, 960 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no
pet.); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 297.
283. Salinas, 960 S.W.2d at 317 (citing R.S. v. B.J.J., 883 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Tex. App.Dallas 1994, no writ)); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 299a.
284. See Salinas, 960 S.W.2d at 320-21 (Seerden, C.J., concurring).
285. Id. at 320.
286. Id. Rule 299a states:
Findings of fact shall not be recited in a judgment. If there is a conflict between findings of fact recited in a judgment in violation of this rule and findings of fact made pursuant to Rules 297 and 298, the latter findings will
control for appellate purposes. Findings of fact shall be filed with the clerk
of the court as a document or documents separate and apart from the
judgment.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 299a.
287. Salinas, 960 S.W.2d at 320.
288. Id. at 317 n.5 & 321. Compare Valley Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Gonzales,
894 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (findings recited in judgment cannot be considered on appeal); and R.S. v. B.J.J., 883 S.W.2d 711, 715-16 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, no writ); and Boland v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 816 S.W.2d 843, 844
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ); and Sutherland v. Cobern, 843 S.W.2d 127, 131 n.7
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) with McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 190
n.6 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (Rule 299a does not bar the effect
of findings included in the judgment when there are no properly-filed conflicting findings);
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SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT

Under the new rules of appellate procedure, no cost bond is required
to perfect an appeal. In fact, the new rules do not authorize the imposition of a cost bond on appeal. Nonetheless, the trial court in the case of
In re Richards,2 89 a divorce case, ordered the appellant to post a "cost
bond" in the amount of $2,000 to cover "the cost of the record on appeal,
'290
the transcript, paying the court reporter, and all that stuff.
On the appellant's motion to the court of appeals to review the "appeal
bond," the appellee in Richards argued that Rule 24.2(a)(3) of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure authorized the bond set by the trial
court.2 91 Rule 24.2(a)(3) provides that when a judgment is for something
other than money or an interest in property "the trial court must set out
the amount and type of security that the judgment debtor must post. The
security must adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or
damage that the appeal might cause. 29 2 Holding that Rule 24.2(a)(3)
was inapplicable and therefore could not provide authority for the bond,
the court of appeals noted that the judgment on appeal simply declared
the status of the parties (as divorced) and divided the community party
according to a property division agreement entered into by both parties.2 93 Accordingly, the appellee/husband was not a judgment creditor,
the appellant/wife was not a judgment debtor, there was nothing under
the judgment upon which the appellee/husband could obtain a writ of
execution, and there was no judgment for the appellant/wife to perform.
"Consequently," the court concluded, "the bond could never become
2' 94
payable and its attempted imposition is an exercise in futility.
Can a judgment creditor obtain a turnover order to collect that part of
a judgment that has been affirmed by the supreme court before the
supreme court issues its mandate and while a supersedeas bond is in
place? The Texarkana Court of Appeals answered this question in the
affirmative in The Universe Life Insurance Company v. Giles.2 95 With
respect to the mandate issue, the court of appeals reasoned that the issuance of a mandate by an appellate court is not necessary to render a judgment final. 296 Under the rules of civil procedure, the issuance and return
of the mandate subsequent to an appellate court's remand "are procedural and not necessary to the jurisdiction of the trial court. '297 Accordingly, irregularities in a proceeding in trial court on a turnover order,
and Kondos Entertainment, Inc. v. Quinney Electric, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1997, writ requested) (Duncan, J., dissenting).
289. No. 07-98-0038-CV, 1998 WL 396424 (Tex. App.-Amarillo July 15, 1998, no pet.).
290. Id. at *1. The appellee requested a bond in the amount of $24,150. Id.
291. See TEX. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(3).
292. Id.
293. See Richards, 1998 WL 396424, at *2.
294. Id.
295. No. 06-97-00112-CV, 1998 WL 691372 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 15, 1998, no
pet. h.).
296. See id. at *3.
297. Id.
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before an appellate court mandate issues, may be waived. 298 Since the
judgment debtor failed to object in the trial court to entry of the turnover
order on the basis that the supreme court's mandate had not yet been
received, that error was waived. 299 Moreover, the court of appeals explained, the entry of the turnover order did not interfere with the
supreme court's active power and authority because the supreme court's
judgment became final when no motion for rehearing was filed within
fifteen days after rendition and entry of the judgment. 300 As a result, the
trial court's entry of the turnover order was not premature. 30 1
The court of appeals also rejected the judgment debtor's argument that
the turnover order was improper because a supersedeas bond had been

filed. 30 2 Under the turnover statute, a judgment creditor is entitled to a

turnover order to reach property to obtain satisfaction of a judgment if
the judgment debtor "owns property .. .that (1) cannot readily be at-

tached or levied on by ordinary legal process; and (2) is not exempt from
attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities. '303 In
Giles, the judgment creditor asserted that the filing of a supersedeas bond
precludes, "as a matter of law, any inference that the judgment debtor is
the owner of property that could not readily be attached by ordinary legal
process because the plaintiff may always resort to the supersedeas bond
in satisfaction of her judgment. ' 30 4
Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals pointed out that a supersedeas bond is a contract for the benefit of the judgment creditor; it is not
property owned by the judgment debtor. 30 5 Accordingly, the turnover
statute does not apply to supersedeas bonds. 306 Under the turnover statute, the judgment creditor need only establish that nonexempt property
cannot readily be attached. 307 "A judgment creditor," the court concluded, "need not first exhaust other legal remedies prior to seeking relief
under the turnover statute if the statutory requirements are met. '308
VII.

PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT

Under the Texas Supreme Court's decision in the case of In re Bennett,30 9 a trial court has jurisdiction to sua sponte sanction counsel after a
notice of nonsuit has been filed and after the suit has been removed to
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id. (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Street, 364 S.W.2d 184, 186-87 (Tex. 1963)).
See id.
See id.
See Giles, 1998 WL 691372, at *3.
See id. at *4.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (Vernon 1998).
1998 WL 691372, at *4.
See id.

306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Id.

309. 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), cert denied, 119 S. Ct.
66 (1998).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

federal court and the federal court has dismissed the nonsuited case. 310
In a flagrant example of conduct constituting an abuse of the judicial
process, counsel for the plaintiffs in Bennett filed sixteen separate lawsuits
in Nueces County, each having no more than five plaintiffs, which were
randomly assigned to one of the eight district courts in the county.3 11 The
first suit was assigned to Judge Bennett's court. 312 Plaintiffs' counsel instructed the clerk of the court not to prepare citation for service in any of
the sixteen cases that had been filed. 313 None of the sixteen suits was
assigned to the 105th District Court. 3 14 However, the seventeenth case
was.3 15 Two hours after that assignment, plaintiffs' counsel filed an
amended petition in the 105th District Court adding approximately 700
plaintiffs, though none of the claimants in the other sixteen suits were
ever joined. 3 16 Five days later, plaintiffs' counsel filed notices of nonsuit
317
in all sixteen previously filed suits.
Judge Bennett did not sign an order of nonsuit in the case pending in
his court, but instead, signed a sua sponte order abating the dismissal and
setting a hearing on sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel.31 8 Prior to the
hearing on sanctions before Judge Bennett, the defendants removed all
seventeen cases to federal court, including the case pending before Judge
Bennett. 319 Nevertheless, Judge Bennett went forward with the sanctions
hearing at which plaintiffs' counsel admitted that the filing process he
320
used was designed to get his clients' claims before a particular judge.
At the close of the hearing, Judge Bennett announced that he intended to
enter an order requiring plaintiffs' counsel each to pay $10,000 as a
32 1
sanction.
Shortly thereafter, before Judge Bennett had reduced his rulings to a
written order, the federal district court consolidated all seventeen cases
that had been removed and dismissed those that had been nonsuited, including the case removed from Judge Bennett's court. 322 (This left pending only the case removed from the 105th District Court. 323 ) Thereafter,
Judge Bennett memorialized his rulings from the sanctions hearing in formal written orders.324 Judge Bennett never signed an order dismissing
the case pursuant to the notice of nonsuit. 325
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 37-40.
id. at 36.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 36-37.
id. at 37.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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In a mandamus proceeding brought by plaintiffs' counsel, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals conditionally issued a writ of mandamus directing Judge Bennett to vacate his order and to sign an order dismissing
326
the case pursuant to the notice of nonsuit.
In the mandamus proceeding thereafter instituted by Judge Bennett in
the Texas Supreme Court, the supreme court first considered whether
Judge Bennett had the authority to sanction counsel after the notice of
nonsuit was filed. 327 Concluding that he did, the supreme court held that
"the signing of an order dismissing a case, not the filing of a notice of
nonsuit, is the starting point for determining when a trial court's plenary
power expires. ' 32 8 "Appellate timetables," the court explained, "do not
run from the date a nonsuit is filed, but rather from the date the trial
court signs an order of dismissal. '329 While acknowledging that, generally, a trial court has no discretion to refuse to sign an order of dismissal
once notice of a nonsuit has been filed, the court concluded that "this
broad principle necessarily has exceptions. '330 One of those exceptions is
stated in Rule 162, which provides that "a dismissal under the rule 'shall
have no effect on any motion for sanctions ... pending at the time of
dismissal.' ' '33 1 Further, the court held, "a trial court is free to 'impose[ ]
sanctions while it retain[s] plenary jurisdiction' even when a motion for
sanctions is filed after the notice of nonsuit is filed."'332 Only after plenary jurisdiction has expired is a trial court precluded from sanctioning
counsel for pre-judgment conduct. 333 As a result, the court concluded,
Judge Bennett was well within his authority to defer signing the order of
334
dismissal pending the disposition of the sanctions issues.
However, the fact that but for the removal, Judge Bennett would have
had plenary power when he signed the order imposing sanctions did not
mean he had the power to do so after the case had been removed and
after the federal court had dismissed the case at the request of the plaintiffs. 335 The court next considered that issue.
Finding little guidance in Texas law on the question, the supreme court
looked to federal case law, which precludes state courts from taking any
action on the merits of a removed case, but permits federal courts to
sanction counsel for post-removal conduct that occurred in federal court
even after a case has been remanded to state court. 336 The court also
326.
327.
328.
329.

See id. at 37-38.
See id. at 38.
Id.
Id. (citing Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995)).

330. Id.
331. Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
332. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 38 (quoting Scott & White Mem'l Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940
S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1996)).
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 39.
336. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d); Moore v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443,
445-46 (9th Cir. 1992).
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noted that Judge Bennett's determinations had no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims that were removed to federal court, and
that abuse of the state judicial process "may be placed beyond the reach
of any court, state or federal, were we to conclude that state courts should
not go forward after removal with an adjudication of sanctions for pre'337
removal conduct of counsel.
Having reviewed federal precedent and the practical ramifications of
the court of appeals' conclusion, the supreme court conditionally granted
the writ of mandamus, holding that "state courts retain jurisdiction after
removal of a case to federal court to sanction lawyers for pre-removal
conduct so long as the sanction does not operate upon the merits of the
'338
underlying action.
VIII. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued a series of
significant opinions-including Verburgt v. Dorner,339 Holmes v. Home
34 1
State County Mutual Insurance Co.,34 0 Harlan v. Howe State Bank,
3
43
Boyd v. American Indemnity Co.,342 and Jones v. City of Houston, reemphasizing that the policy embodied in the appellate rules "disfavors
disposing of appeals based upon harmless procedural defects." 344 In that
line of cases, the Texas Supreme Court held that a motion for extension
of time to file a cost bond, cash deposit in lieu of bond, or affidavit of
indigency in lieu of cost bond is implied when a party, acting in good
faith, files such instrument or cash deposit within the fifteen-day period in
which the rules of appellate procedure permit parties to file a motion to
extend the time period for filing such instruments or cash deposit to perfect an appeal. 345 The court reasoned in the lead case, Verburgt, that it
"has never wavered from the principle that appellate courts should not
dismiss an appeal for a procedural defect whenever any arguable interpretation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure would preserve the appeal. ' 34 6 The court noted that it has repeatedly held that a court of
appeals has jurisdiction over any appeal in which the appellant files an
instrument in a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdic337. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 39-40.
338. Id. at 40. The supreme court also concluded that Judge Bennett did not abuse his
discretion in imposing sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel for their inappropriate conduct.
See id.
339. 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997).
340. 958 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1997).
341. 958 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1997).
342. 958 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1997).
343. 976 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1998).
344. Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616.
345. See Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616-17 (applying implied motion for extension to filing
of cost bond); see also Holmes, 958 S.W.2d at 381-82; Harlan, 958 S.W.2d at 381; Boyd, 958
S.W.2d at 380 (applying implied motion for extension to filing of cash deposit in lieu of cost
bond); Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677 (applying implied motion for extension to filing of affidavit
in lieu of bond).
346. 959 S.W.2d at 616.
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tion, and that the rules of appellate procedure should be construed reasonably, "yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing
'347
requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule.
Refusing to elevate form over substance, the court held that a motion for
extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good
faith files a bond beyond the time allowed by the rules of appellate procedure, but within the fifteen-day period in which he would be entitled to
348
move to extend the filing deadline under the rules.

Justice Enoch, joined by Justices Abbott and Hankinson, dissented,
stating at the outset that "[f]rom today forward, one need no longer
timely appeal to invoke an appellate court's jurisdiction. '349 Justice
Enoch contended that the majority's "implied motion" is not a "arguable
interpretation" of the rules of appellate procedure, which, he agreed, is
permissible to preserve an appeal, but, rather, a contradiction to the plain
language of the rules. 350 "When next," he asked, "will the Court 'imply'
35 1
filings that were never made?"
Justice Baker also dissented, arguing that the decision reached by the
court of appeals in Verburgt was the decision required by applying the
plain and unambiguous language of the rules. 352 According to Justice

Baker, "[t]he Court's opinion dispenses with [the rule's] requirements,
'353
and amends the rule by judicial fiat."
Although the supreme court has applied the Verburgt implied-motion
doctrine only in the context of the old rules of appellate procedure, there
is no reason to think the court would not similarly imply a motion for
extension to a late notice of appeal filed under the new rules of appellate
procedure. Indeed, the supreme court expanded the implied-motion doctrine of Verburgt, a late-filed cost bond case, to a late-filed affidavit in lieu
of bond in Jones on the rationale that an affidavit in lieu of bond "is
simply an alternate device for perfecting appeal under former Rule
41." 354 In fact, at least one court of appeals has published an opinion

applying the Verburgt implied-motion doctrine to a late notice of appeal
347. See id. at 616-17 (citing Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994);
Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993)).
348. See id. at 617.
349. Id. at 617 (Enoch, J.,
dissenting). Justice Enoch also dissented to Verburgt's companion cases, Boyd, Harlan, and Holmes. Id. at 619 n.3.
350. See id.

351. Id. at 619. Three months after the supreme court's opinion in Verburgt, Justice
Enoch found out "[wihen next" the court would "'imply' filings that were never made." In
Miller v. Metro Health Foundation, 968 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1998), the supreme court applied
the Verburgt implied-motion doctrine to the filing of the appellate record. Id. at 338. (As
noted by the court in Miller, "the new rules of appellate procedure have repealed the
requirement that the appellant file a motion for extension of time if the record is not timely
filed, and instead place the burden on the trial and appellate court to ensure that the record is timely filed." Id. at 338 n.1 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 35.3(c)).
352. See Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 619 (Baker, J., dissenting).
353. Id. Justice Baker also dissented to Verburgt's companion cases, Boyd, Harlan, and
Holmes. See id. at 619 n.1.
354. Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677.
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filed under the new rules. 355
Under Verburgt and its progeny, to be entitled to an implied motion for
extension of time, the appellant must offer a "reasonable explanation" for
his failure to timely file his notice of appeal. 356 What is a "reasonable
explanation"? A "reasonable explanation" is "[a]ny plausible statement
of circumstances indicating that failure to file ...was not deliberate or
intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance...
in
even though counsel or his secretary may appear to have been lacking'357
the degree of diligence which careful practitioners normally exercise.
In short, the standard encompasses the negligence of counsel as a reason358
able explanation.
IX.

THE RECORD ON APPEAL

When the complaint on appeal is that the evidence is factually or legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict, "this burden cannot be dis'359
charged in the absence of a complete or an agreed statement of facts.
A statement of facts (or, reporter's record) is not complete if portions of
a videotaped deposition were played for the jury but the statement of
facts does not contain either the videotape or a transcription of the testi360
mony played.
As an alternative to producing a complete reporter's record, of course,
an appellant may limit the appeal by complying with rule 34.6(c) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires an appellant who
355. See Dimotsis v. Lloyds, 966 S.W.2d 657, 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no
pet. h.) ("A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in
good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1 but within the
fifteen-day grace period provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time."
(emphasis added)); Kaliski v. State, 963 S.W.2d 786, 786-87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998,
no pet.) (per curiam) ("We recognize that the Supreme Court has held 'that a motion for
extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith files a
[perfecting instrument] beyond the time allowed . . . but within the fifteen-day period in
which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline."'). Moreover,
a review of several unpublished opinions of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reveals that
that court considers the implied-motion doctrine of Verburgt applicable to a late notice of
appeal filed under the new rules of appellate procedure. See Kutcher v. Vega, No. 14-9800238-CV, 1998 WL 470382, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 1998, no pet.
h.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication); see also Wade v. Commission for Lawyer
Discipline, No. 14-98-00682-CV, 1998 WL 506226, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 20, 1998, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).
356. Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617; Dimotsis, 966 S.W.2d at 657.
357. Dimotsis, 966 S.W.2d at 657 (quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d
668, 670 (Tex. 1989)).
358. See id. In Dimotisis, the San Antonio Court of Appeals accepted as a "reasonable
explanation" counsel for appellant's erroneous calculation of the perfection deadline (he
calculated the perfection deadline by adding 30 days to the date the trial court overruled
the appellant's motion for new trial). See 966 S.W.2d at 657-58. Because the late filing was
not intentional or deliberate, but, instead, due to the attorney's misunderstanding of the
law, the explanation offered was a "reasonable" one. See id.
359. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie, 979 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1998, orig. proceeding) (citing Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex.
1968)).
360. See id.
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intends to appeal with a partial reporter's record to include in its request
a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal. 36 1 However, when an appellant appeals with a partial reporter's record but does
not provide the list of points as required by Rule 34.6(c), a presumption
362
arises that the omitted portions support the trial court's findings.
Is a party entitled to a new trial if, during trial, the court reporter's
machine becomes inoperable and the parties agree to continue with a
tape recorder but, unbeknownst to either party, within minutes, the tape
recorder begins to malfunction rendering the tape recorded portions of
the trial partially inaudible? The answer depends on which court of appeals you are in and whether your case is governed by the old rules of
appellate procedure.
Under old Rule 50(e), an appellant is entitled to a new trial if (1) he
has made a timely request for a statement of facts, (2) the court reporter's
notes and records "have been lost or destroyed," and (3) the parties do
not agree on a statement of facts. 363 According to the Beaumont Court
of Appeals' opinion in Richardson,364 the second requirement contemplates that testimony "was actually memorialized by some method and
'365
that the existing memorialized testimony was either lost or destroyed.
Under this interpretation of the second requirement, a party who fails to
ensure that a tape recording device is working properly-even though no
one in the court room is aware that the recorder is faulty and, in fact, the
tape recorder is being used to remedy a previous problem with the court
reporter's machine-fails to meet the second requirement and is not enti366
tled to a new trial.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has held to the contrary 367 and, notably, the new rules of appellate procedure expressly state that a new trial is
appropriate where a significant portion of an electronically recorded pro368
ceeding is inaudible.
361. See Richards v. Schion, 969 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
no pet.); TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(c)(1).
362. See Richards, 969 S.W.2d at 133.
363. Richardson v. Richardson, 969 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no
pet. h.); TEX. R. App. P. 50(e) (repealed).
364. 969 S.W.2d at 536.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 536-37. Justice Stover dissented, noting that, while litigants have a duty to
ensure that a proper record is made for appellate review, "a certain amount of reliance
must be placed upon professional court reporters during trial proceedings." Id. at 537
(Stover, J.,
dissenting). Inthe dissent's view, the appellant in Richardson was sufficiently
diligent in protecting the record for appeal, and entitled to a remand for new trial. See id.
367. See Gillen v. Williams Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 933 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
368. See TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(f)(2). Rule 34.6(f) provides:
(f) Reporter's Record Lost or Destroyed. An appellant is entitled to a new
trial under the following circumstances:
(1) if the appellant has timely requested a reporter's record;
(2) if, without the appellant's fault, a significant exhibit or a significant
portion of the court reporter's notes and records has been lost or destroyed
or-if the proceedings were electronically recorded-a significant portion of
the recording has been lost or destroyed or is inaudible;
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X. STAY OF APPEAL
Disagreeing with its own precedent, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held in Burns v. Burns369 that, under Rule 8.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the bankruptcy of a debtor who is both appellant and
plaintiff in a pending lawsuit suspends the appeal and all appellate periods. 370 Rule 8.2 provides that "[a] bankruptcy suspends the appeal and
all periods in these rules from the date when the bankruptcy petition is
filed until the appellate court reinstates or severs the appeal in accordance with federal law."'37 1 The San Antonio Court of Appeals previously
held in Thiel v. ThieP72 that "the stay does not apply" if the debtor was
the plaintiff in the court below. 373 In reaching this conclusion in Thiel,
the San Antonio court relied on the language of the bankruptcy code,
which provides that a bankruptcy automatically stays all judicial proceedings "against the debtor. ' 374 In Burns, the San Antonio court reached
the opposite conclusion by noting that Rule 8.2 of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure applies "to any party to the trial court's judgment."
"Because [Rule 8.2] applies to any party to the trial court judgment," the
court reasoned, "we read the ... phrase 'in accordance with federal law'
as modifying the reinstatement and severance procedures more fully described in Rule 8.3 [of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure]." 375 The
court accordingly refused to read the phrase "in accordance with federal
law" as requiring congruency between the application of Rule 8.2's stay
of the appeal and the application of the automatic stay under bankruptcy
law.
XI.

CONDUCT OF COUNSEL BEFORE COURTS OF APPEAL

The Disciplinary Rules governing the conduct of a lawyer provide that
"[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those
who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. ' 376 As
vividly demonstrated by the Texas Supreme Court during last year's Survey period in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Havner,377 courts possess inherent power to discipline an attorney who violates this rule. In
Havner, the supreme court found that the motion for rehearing filed by
three of the respondents' attorneys rose to the level of "judicial denigra(3) if the lost, destroyed, or inaudible portion of the reporter's record, or
the lost or destroyed exhibit, is necessary tot he appeal's resolution; and
(4) if the parties cannot agree on a complete reporter's record.
TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(f).

369. 974 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.) (per curiam).
370. See id. at 820.
371. TEX. R. App. P. 8.2.
372. 780 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
373. Id. at 930.
374. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
375. Burns, 974 S.W.2d at 820-21.
376. TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCt preamble 4, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit.2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1997) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9).
377. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1799 (1998).
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tion" and "personal insult. '378 Finding the tenor of the motion highly
inappropriate, the supreme court agreed with the San Antonio Court of
Appeals' comments in the case of In re Maloney379 regarding attacks on
the integrity of that court:
A distinction must be drawn between respectful advocacy and judicial denigration. Although the former is entitled to a protected
voice, the latter can only be condoned at the expense of the public's
confidence in the judicial process. Even were this court willing to
tolerate the personal insult levied by [counsel], we are obligated to
maintain the respect
due this court and the legal system we took an
3s
oath to serve.
Accordingly, the supreme court ordered the attorneys who drafted the
motion for rehearing to show why the court should not refer them to
disciplinary authorities, preclude one of the out-of-state attorneys from
practicing in Texas courts, and impose monetary penalties as sanctions. 38 1
On December 11, 1997, the supreme court entered an order referring
the matter for disciplinary proceedings. 38 2 Although not disputing that
the motion for rehearing was "an intemperate attack on the members of
this Court," Justice Spector dissented from the order of referral. 3 83 In her
dissent, Justice Spector stated that she did not believe the writing could
possibly form the basis for lawyer discipline. 384 She argued that "attempts to stifle criticism of judges and our courts may, in fact, be counterproductive. '38 5 In support of this belief, she quoted the comments of
Justice Black from more than fifty years ago in the context of a contempt
proceeding for statements published in a newspaper:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
published institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited,
solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would
probably engender resentment, 386
suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect.
XII. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
If an appellant pursues a frivolous appeal, the court of appeals may
award each prevailing party "just damages. ' 38 7 As discussed by the Four378. Id. at 732-33.
379. 949 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ) (en banc) (per curiam).
380. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 732 (quoting Maloney, 949 S.W.2d at 388).
381. See id. at 733.
382. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 956 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1997) (Spector, J.,
dissenting).
383. See id. at 532.
384. See id.
385. Id.
386. Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941)).
387. In relevant part, Rule 45 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: "If
the court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may-on motion of any party
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teenth Court of Appeals in Tate v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 388
factors to be considered in deciding whether to impose sanctions for a
frivolous appeal include: "(i) the failure to present a complete record, (ii)
the raising of certain issues fore the first time on appeal, (iii) the failure to
file a response to a cross-point requesting sanctions, (iv) and the filing of
an inadequate appellate brief. '389 Finding all of these factors present in
the appeal taken in Tate, the Fourteenth Court accordingly awarded the
appellee five times the taxable costs of the appeal. 390
XIII.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In Minnesota Mining and ManufacturingCo. v. Atterbury,39 1 a products
liability and negligence action brought by users of silicone gel breast implants against 3M, the implant manufacturer, the Texarkana Court of Appeals analyzed the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's
findings that the breast implants had marketing, manufacturing, and design defects when they left the manufacturer 392 and that the defects found
by the jury constituted the producing cause of the illness or injury to the
plaintiffs. 393 The court of appeals held that the trial court's exclusion of
scientific testimony, even though such a determination must be based on
the objective factors enunciated in Daubert,39 4 Robinson395 and Havner,396 is reviewable for abuse of discretion, 397 while the sufficiency of

scientific evidence admitted at trial is reviewed under a traditional "sufficiency of the evidence" standard. 398 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs and rendered judgment for the
defendant manufacturer, holding that the scientific opinions of three expert witnesses who had testified that the plaintiffs' injuries and illnesses
were caused by silicone implants were not "scientifically reliable" under
the Daubert-Robinson-Havnerstandards 399 and were therefore legally inor on its own initiative, after notice and a reasonable opportunity for response-award
each prevailing party just damages." TEX. R. APP. P. 45. Damages for frivolous appeals
were also available under Rule 84 of the old rules of appellate procedure. New Rule 45
alters Rule 84 in only two respects: Rule 45 repealed old Rule 84's limit on the amount of
the sanction that may be imposed by the court of appeals, and includes the requirement of
notice and opportunity to respond.
388. 954 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
389. Id. at 875.
390. See id.
391. 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. filed).
392. See id. at 186.
393. See id.
394. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
395. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
396. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
397. See Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d at 192.
398. See id. The court of appeals did note, however, that this type of review is under
"an almost de novo standard because the 'in the light most favorable to the judgment'
standard appears to be all but eviscerated" under Robinson and Havner. Atterbury, 978
S.W.2d at 192.
399. As stated by the Atterbury court:
[T]he factors to which a reviewing court should look in determining the reliability of scientific testimony are: 1) the extent to which the theory has been or
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sufficient to support the jury's causation findings. 400 In its discussion of
the defendant's "no evidence" points, the court of appeals followed the

standard of review for scientific evidence set forth in Havner.40 1 Among
other things, the court of appeals stated that (1) a single reliable epidemiological study that demonstrates a statistically significant association will

not, absent verification of its results by another study, be enough to satisfy a legal sufficiency review; (2) abstracts that reanalyze other epidemiological evidence and that do not state the methodologies used, including
the significance level, the confidence level, and the choice of control

group, will not be considered; (3) an expert's prior unpublished and undocumented experience will not be enough to support a finding of causa-

tion; (4)

even published, peer reviewed case reports are legally

insufficient to support causation unless the reports could be considered

unisolated and detail their methodology so that there can be further scientific evaluation of them; and (5) an expert's assertion that a physical
40 2
examination confirmed causation should not be accepted at face value.
In Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis,40 3 a gross negligence and unseaworthiness maritime law case brought under the Jones Act4 °4 and the
Federal Employers' Liability Act 40 5 for damages for delayed neurotoxic

effects allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic chemical pesticide Diazinon, the supreme court recognized that the standard of appellate review
for sufficiency of the evidence as to liability is less stringent in Jones Act
and FELA cases than under the common law, but that traditional appellate sufficiency review applies to damages review.40 6 This is so because
the causation burden is not the common law proximate causation standard, but rather is a "featherweight" burden under which the claimant
need only show that "employer negligence played any part, even the
can be tested; 2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective
interpretation of the expert; 3) whether the theory has been subjected to
peer review and/or publication; 4) the technique's potential rate of error; 5)
whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as
valid by the relevant scientific community; 6) the nonjudicial uses which have
been made of the theory or technique; and 7) any other factor which is helpful to determine the reliability of the scientific evidence.
978 S.W.2d at 199-200 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714 (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at
557)).
400. See Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d at 199-202.
401. Courts must make a determination of reliability from all the evidence.
Courts should allow a party, plaintiff or defendant, to present the best available evidence, assuming it passes muster under Robinson, and only then
should a court determine from a totality of the evidence, considering all factors affecting the reliability of particular studies, whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a judgment.
Id. at 198 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720).
402. See id. at 198-99.
403. 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 541 (1998).
404. 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1998).
405. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1998).
406. See Maritime Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 406 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Roberts, 481
S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1972) and Brown & Root, Inc. v. Wade, 510 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
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slightest, in7 producing the injury for which the claimant seeks
4
damages.'1 0
In such cases, Texas appellate courts must apply a less stringent federal
standard of liability review, under which appellate sufficiency review is
complete and the jury's liability verdict stands "once the appellate court
determines that some evidence about which reasonable minds could differ supports the verdict" as to liability. 4 8 Texas courts of appeals may
not conduct a traditional factual sufficiency review as to liability under
Texas' "weight and preponderance" standard in Jones Act and FELA
40 9
cases.
With respect to damages, however, the supreme court held that Texas
courts of appeals have the power to review excessiveness of damages and
to order remittitur in FELA actions and, by implication, in Jones Act
cases. 4 t1 The court of appeals is required to "make its own 'detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages."' 4 11 The standard of review
for an excessive damages complaint is the traditional factual sufficiency of
the evidence review, which requires the court of appeals to consider and
weigh all of the evidence, not just that supporting the verdict, 412 and,
when reversing for factual insufficiency, to "detail all the evidence relevant to the issue and clearly state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
that it is manifestly unjust."' 4t 3 The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that the court of appeals used the wrong standard of review regarding the actual damages award, holding that the traditional
factual sufficiency review of damages was correct and that the defendant
had waived its Daubert-Robinson-Havnerargument that a higher standard of review should apply by failing to timely object to the admission of
4 14
scientific testimony supporting the actual damages award.
In Spangler v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services,4 15 an
appeal from a jury verdict and judgment terminating parental rights, the
Waco Court of Appeals articulated an "intermediate" standard of factual
sufficiency review (between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil
proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings)
applicable to trial court factual determinations made under the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard. 4 16 The court of appeals recognized that
407. Maritime Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352
U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957)).
408. Maritime Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 406.
409. See id.
410. See id.
411. See id. (quoting Nairn v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 837 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir.
1988)).
412. Id. at 406,407 (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) and Lofton v.
Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986)).
413. Id. at 407 (citing Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.
1994) and Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)).
414. Id. at 408-411.
415. 962 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet.).
416. See id. at 257.
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the ordinary factual sufficiency standard of review, which applies to factual findings made under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 4 17
does not take into account the heightened "clear and convincing" standard of proof applied in parental termination cases. 4 18 Stating that it did

not believe "that the Texas Supreme Court intends to require trial courts
to adhere to a higher standard of proof in termination cases while allowing the courts of appeals to use the same standard of review as in
cases decided by a preponderance of the evidence," 41 9 the court of appeals adopted the following rule:
When the trier of fact is required to make a finding by clear and
convincing evidence, the court of appeals will only sustain a point of
error alleging insufficient evidence if the trier of fact could not reasonably find the existence
of the fact to be established by clear and
42 0
convincing evidence.

This rule, the court of appeals stated, is consistent with the treatment of
the issue by other intermediate courts of appeals. 4 21 The court of appeals
also stated that its intermediate rule is reconcilable with supreme court
cases refusing to apply a third standard of review. 42 2 While the policy

supporting the intermediate rule adopted by the Spangler court may be
reconcilable with the policy behind the supreme court's holding in Meadows v. Green, the court of appeals' adoption of an intermediate standard
of review appears inconsistent on its face with the supreme court's holding that "[in Texas there are but two standards of review by which evidence is reviewed: factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency. ' 42 3 Indeed,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals in Meadows, holding that
the court of appeals' adoption of a third standard of review conflicted
with prior supreme court decisions on point. 42 4 If, as the supreme court
held in Meadows, "clear and convincing evidence is but another way of
describing factual sufficiency of the evidence," 42 5 then the necessity or
validity of the intermediate rule adopted in Spanglermust be questioned.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied established standards of
review in affirming the trial court's exclusion of evidence in Pace v. Sadler,426 a medical malpractice action in which the trial court excluded evidence proffered by the plaintiff to show misrepresentations by the
417. The Spangler court stated that "In preponderance cases, insufficient evidence
points should be sustained when: (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
finding by the preponderance of the evidence; or (2) a finding is contrary to the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence." Id. (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence"
and Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,38 TEXAS L. REv. 361, 366 (1960)).
418. See id. at 257.
419. Spangler, 962 S.W.2d at 257.

420. Id.

421. See, e.g., In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ);
Neiswander v. Bailey, 645 S.W.2d 835, 835-36 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
422. See Spangler, 962 S.W.2d at 257 (quoting Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510
(Tex. 1975) (per curiam)).
423. Meadows, 524 S.W.2d at 510.
424. See id. (citing Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960)).
425. Meadows, 524 S.W.2d at 510.
426. 966 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
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defendants about her husband's medical records.42 7 The court of appeals
held that the exclusion of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 428 and that to justify reversal, "the trial court's error must
have amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was rea'429
sonably calculated to cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
The appellate court makes its determination on this issue by reviewing
430
the entire record.
In Bocquet v. Herring,43 1 the supreme court clarified the abuse of discretion standard of review applicable to attorney fee awards under Texas'
Declaratory Judgments Act. 432 Reversing the court of appeals' decision
ordering reversal and remand for a new trial unless the defendants remitted a substantial portion of the attorney fees awarded them by the trial
court, the supreme court held that the court of appeals must undertake a
"multi-faceted review involving both evidentiary and discretionary matters" to "determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding fees when there was insufficient evidence that the fees were
reasonable and necessary, or when the award was inequitable or unjust. ' 4 33 According to the supreme court, the court of appeals' error was
in reversing for factual insufficiency of the evidence of the reasonableness
and necessity of the attorney fees awarded by the trial court without detailing all the relevant evidence and explaining in its opinion why the evi4 34
dence was factually insufficient.
In two cases decided during the survey period, the supreme court addressed the quantum of circumstantial evidence required to survive a "no
evidence" challenge. In Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards,435 a suit by a
tenant against his landlord for negligence and gross negligence in connection with an assault on the tenant by two contract employees of the landlord, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals' punitive damage
award against the corporate landlord based on a jury finding that the
landlord's leasing agent was a "vice principal" under Texas law such that
the leasing agent's alleged misconduct in failing to respond appropriately
to threats made by the contract employees was properly imputed to the
corporation in order to support an award of punitive damages. 436
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

See id. at 687.
See id.
See id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)).
See id. (citing McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1992)).
972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998).
432. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997).
433. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21.
434. See id. (citing Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841, 848 (Tex. 1990)).
435. 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997).
436. See id. at 391 (citing Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d
397 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712
(Tex. 1987)); see also Chronister Lumber Co. v. Williams, 116 Tex. 207, 288 S.W. 402
(1926). As stated in Fort Worth Elevators, the term "vice principal" encompasses four
classes of corporate agents: "(a) Corporate officers; (b) those who have authority to employ, direct, and discharge servants of the master; (c) those engaged in the performance of
nondelegable or absolute duties of the master; and (d) those to whom a master has con-
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Agreeing with the trial court's disregard of the jury's findings of gross
negligence and award of punitive damages, 437 the supreme court held
that the plaintiff's sole evidence of the leasing agent's corporate authority, the fact that she was alone in the leasing office when the contract
employee voiced a threat to harm the plaintiff, was no evidence "that
Montgomery [the leasing agent] was in charge at that moment in time" or
that "Montgomery was a vice principal. '438 Where the plaintiff relies on
"'meager circumstantial evidence' which could give rise to any number of
inferences, none more probable than another, ' 439 such evidence is legally
insufficient to support a judgment. 440
The Hammerly Oaks holding was cited with approval by the supreme
court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez,441 a slip-and-fall case in which
the trial court's damage award to the plaintiff of over $96,000.00, affirmed
by the San Antonio Court of Appeals, was reversed and a take nothing
judgment rendered for the defendant. 442 The central issue in Wal-Mart
was whether testimony by the plaintiff and her daughter that the cooked
macaroni salad on the floor of Wal-Mart on which the plaintiff slipped
and fell had mayonnaise in it, was "fresh," "wet," "still humid," contaminated with "a lot of dirt," had footprints and cart track marks in it and
"seemed like it had been there a while" was legally sufficient to charge
Wal-Mart with constructive notice necessary of the spill adequate to sup443
port the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment.
The supreme court stated the settled rule that its duty when considering a legal sufficiency point is to "consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court's finding, disregarding all contrary
evidence and inferences." 44 4 The supreme court also noted the rule in
Hammerly Oaks, that "meager circumstantial evidence from which
equally plausible but opposite inferences may be
drawn is speculative and
445
thus legally insufficient to support a finding."
After noting that no witnesses testified that they had seen or were
44 6
aware of the spilled macaroni salad before the plaintiff slipped on it,
the court surveyed the spilled macaroni cases decided by the courts of
appeals 44 7 and held that the evidence of causation was legally insufficient
fided the management of the whole or a department or division of his business." Fort
Worth Elevators, 70 S.W.2d at 406.
437. See id. at 390.
438. Id. at 392.
439. Id. (quoting Blount v. Bordens, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. 1995)) (quoting
Litton Indus. Prods. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984)).
440. See id.
441. 968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998).
442. See id. at 935-36.
443. See id. at 936-37.
444. Id. at 936 (quoting Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450
(Tex. 1996)).
445. Id. (citing Hammerly Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 392).
446. See id.
447. See id. at 937 (citing, inter alia, Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Arellano, 492 S.W.2d
727 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Heaton,
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to support the judgment."48 The court held that the plaintiff's testimony
that the macaroni salad had "a lot of dirt" and tracks through it was "no
evidence of the length of time the macaroni had been on the floor," 449
that the presence of footprints and cart tracks in the macaroni salad
"equally supports the inference that the tracks were of recent origin as it
supports the opposite inference, that the tracks had been there a long
time," 450 and that the testimony that the macaroni salad "seemed like it
had been there awhile [sic]" was "mere speculative, subjective opinion of
no evidentiary value. '45 1 This evidence, the court concluded, was not legally sufficient to establish that Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the
4 52
dangerous condition.
In McCain v. McCain,453 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied an
abuse of discretion standard in affirming the trial court's modification of
child support payments. 454 The appellant argued unsuccessfully on appeal that, absent evidence of the proven needs of the children at the time
of the divorce decree, the trial court could not find that the needs of the
children had materially and substantially changed, 455 as required by Section 154.126 of the Texas Family Code. 456 The court of appeals disagreed
with appellant's interpretation of Section 154.126, holding that the trial
court must only consider the income of the parties and the proven needs
of the child, and that no showing need be made of an increase in the
proven needs of the child.4 5 7 The court noted that, while the appellee
testified that the children's needs were $4,241.00 per month, the trial
court found that the proven needs of the children were only $3,835.00 per
month and that appellant's net resources exceeded $6,000.00 per month,
which allowed the trial court to award additional support.4 58 In overruling the appellant's factual and legal sufficiency points, the court of appeals observed that "legal and factual sufficiency are not independent
grounds for review, but are only relevant factors in assessing whether the
547 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ)). The supreme court also considered slip-and-fall cases involving grapes, syrup and jelly, and dirty water in its analysis. Id.
(citing H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Rodriguez, 441 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1969, no writ) (grapes); H.E. Butt Grocery Store v. Hamilton, 632 S.W.2d 189, 191
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (grapes); Kimbell, Inc. v. Roberson, 570 S.W.2d
587, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ) ("a syrupy or jellylike substance"); Robledo
v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560, 560-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(dirty water); Kimbell, Inc. v. Blount, 562 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no
writ) (puddle of liquid)).
448. See id. at 938.
449. Id.
450. Id.

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

Id.
See
980
See
See

id.
S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Sept. 24, 1998, no pet. h.).
id. at 89.
id.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.126 (West 1996).
See McCain, 980 S.W.2d at 801 (West 1996).
See id.
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lower court abused its discretion. '459
The trial court's imposition of "death penalty" discovery sanctions is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In Chasewood Oaks
Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Amatek Holdings,
Inc.,460 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a products liability action as a sanction for the plaintiff's repeated
failure to answer interrogatories and respond to requests for production,
despite being ordered to do so at least four times over the course of a
year.46 1 The court of appeals held that, under its abuse of discretion review, the trial court abuses its discretion by dismissing a case unless such
an extreme sanction is "just. ' 462 This determination, the court held, is
made by reference to the TransAmerican factors, i.e., if the record reveals
that:
1. There exists a direct relationship between the offensive conduct
and the sanction imposed;
2. The sanction imposed is not excessive in the circumstances, i.e.
"The punishment must fit the crime";
3. The trial court first imposed lesser sanctions to test their effectiveness at securing compliance, deterrence, and punishment of the offense;463 and
4. The sanctioned conduct justifies
a presumption that the party's
464
claim or defense lacks merit.
In Magnolia Gas Co. v. Knight Equip. & Manufacturing Corp.,465 an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a special appearance pursuant to
Section 51.014(a)(7) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,466
the San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed with the contention of the
parties to the appeal that the evidence should be reviewed under a factual
sufficiency standard, holding instead that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review, "at least in the interlocutory setting. '467 Con459. Id. (citing In re G.J.S., 940 S.W.2d 289, 293 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no
writ) and D.R. v. J.A.R., 894 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied) (op.
on reh'g)).
460. 977 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
461. See id. at 844-45.
462. See id. at 841 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992); TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811
S.W.2d 913, 916-17 (Tex. 1991).
463. The "lesser sanctions" imposed by the trial court consisted of (i) three threats of
dismissal and (ii) the abatement of plaintiff's propounded discovery until the plaintiff fully
complied with the defendant's outstanding discovery. See id. at 845.
464. Id. at 842 (citing Chrysler Corp., 841 S.W.2d at 849-50) (citing TransAmerican, 811
S.W.2d at 917, 918); Andras v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 888 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
465. No. 04-98-00156-CV, 1998 WL 652548 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
466. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
467. Magnolia Gas Co., 1998 WL 652548, at *2-*3. The court of appeals expressed no
opinion "about the propriety of factual sufficiency review in post-trial appeals of special
appearances." Id. at *3, n. 5, comparing NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 812 S.W.2d
441, 442-43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ) (applying factual sufficiency standard)
with Thorpe v. Volkert, 882 S.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
writ) (applying abuse of discretion standard).
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clusions of law are reviewed de novo.468 The court of appeals noted its
obligation to apply the following factors in its review and reversal of the
trial court's denial of a special appearance:
(1) the burden on the defendants; (2) the interests of the forum state
in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
(5) the shared 4interest
of the several states in furthering fundamental
69
social policies.
As an aside, both the majority and the dissent noted that, while the defendants had requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court entered none.4 70 As a result, the court of appeals held, all questions
'4 71
of fact were "presumed to support the judgment.
This legal conclusion is erroneous and unsupported by the authorities
cited by the court of appeals for the proposition, which hold that questions of fact will be presumed and found in support of the judgment only
when findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither requested of nor
filed by the trial court.4 72 Where a proper request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law is made, the trial court's duty to file findings and conclusions is mandatory, and the trial court's failure to respond "is presumed harmful, unless 'the record before [the] appellate court
' 473
affirmatively shows that the complaining party has suffered no injury."'
In Jackson v. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc.,4 74 the Beaumont Court of
Appeals held that jury misconduct is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 475 The determination of whether jury misconduct occurred
is a question of fact for the trial court, and if there is conflicting evidence
4 76
on the issue, the trial court's finding must be upheld on appeal.
In Jackson, the plaintiff/appellant complained of two types of jury misconduct: the failure of a juror to disclose bias or prejudice during voir
dire (a juror concealed that she had previously served on a jury in a personal injury case that awarded no damages, and she "did not believe in
'awarding money in stuff like that") 4 77 and the failure of the same juror
to follow court instructions to refrain from, among other things, discuss468. See id. at *6 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).
469. Id. at *7 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) and
Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223,231
(Tex. 1991)).
470. See id. at *3 (majority) and *8 (dissent).
471. Id. at *3 (citing Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988) and Hawsey v. Louisiana Dep't of Soc. Servs., 934
S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied)).
472. Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 666 (citing Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 358
(Tex. 1977)).
473. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989) (quoting Wagner v. Riske, 142 Tex. 337, 343, 178 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1944)).
474. 974 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. granted).
475. See id. at 953.
476. See id. (citing Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996)).
477. Id. at 956.
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ing the case with other jurors prior to the beginning of jury deliberations.478 The court of appeals reviewed cases construing Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 327(a) 479 and 327(b) 480 and Texas Rule of Evidence
606(b), 48 1 which govern the review of jury misconduct. The court of appeals then held that the provisions of Rule 327(b) excluding testimony
regarding evidence of jury misconduct if the only evidence of misconduct
is that which "emanates from jury deliberations '482 render Rule 327(b)
unconstitutional as a violation of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
the Sixth 483 and Fourteenth 484 Amendments to the United States Consti478. See id. at 957.
479. Rule 327(a) states:
When the ground of a motion for new trial, supported by affidavit, is misconduct of the jury or of the officer in charge of them, or because of any communication made to the jury, or that a juror gave an erroneous or incorrect
answer on voir dire examination, the court shall hear evidence thereof from
the jury or others in open court, and may grant a new trial
if such misconduct
proved, or the communication made, or the erroneous or incorrect answer on
voir dire examination, be material, and if it reasonably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion and the trial of the case and from
the record as a whole that injury probably resulted to the complaining party.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(a).
480. Rule 327(b) states:
A juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except
that a juror may testify whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any
statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
481. Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the jury's deliberations,
or to the effect of anything on any juror's mind or emotions or mental process, as influencing any juror's assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment. Nor may a juror's affidavit or any statement by a juror concerning any
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be admitted
in evidence for any of these purposes.
TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
482. Jackson, 974 S.W.2d at 956.
483. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
484. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

tution, as well as Article I section 15 of the Texas Constitution, 485 because
it "literally makes it impossible to satisfy the constitutional mandate that
the purity of the composition of the jury was maintained. 48 6
The dissent, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that all of the
evidence of jury misconduct was barred by Rule 327(b), was not of the
view that Rule 327(b) was "even implicated in the trial court's decision
on the voir dire misconduct issue."' 487 According to the dissent, the majority's holding that Rule 327(b) is unconstitutional "burns the house to
roast the pig," 4 88 particularly since the record reflected that the juror
whose conduct the plaintiff complained of had voted favorably for the
489
plaintiff in a 10-2 verdict.
In General Motors Corp. v. Castaneda,4 9° a negligence and products
liability case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reiterated the settled
standards of review of legal sufficiency points and venue determinations.
The defendant, General Motors, challenged the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury's findings on causation (on which it did not
have the burden of proof) and comparative negligence (on which it did)
491
as well as venue in Duval County.
As the court of appeals held, a party challenging the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support a finding on which the party did not have the
burden of proof at trial must demonstrate that there is no evidence to
support the finding. 492 In deciding a "no evidence" issue, the court of
appeals "consider[s] all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, indulging every reasonable inference in that party's
favor," 493 and must uphold the finding of the trial court if it "encounter[s]
'' 494
any evidence of probative force to support it.
A party challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding on which the party bore the burden of proof at trial must show
that the evidence "conclusively established all vital facts in support of the
issue. ' 495 The court of appeals employs a two-part test, first examining
the entire record for evidence supporting the jury finding, while ignoring
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
485. Article I § 15 of the Texas Constitution states: "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the
same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency." TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
486. Jackson, 974 S.W.2d at 957.
487. Id. at 961.
488. Id. at 959.
489. See id. at 961, n. 2.
490. 980 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 16, 1998, pet. filed).
491. See id. at 779-80.
492. See id.
493. Id. (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs, 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.
1998) and Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).
494. Castaneda, 980 S.W.2d at 780 (citing Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774
S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989)). Accord General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 966 S.W.2d 545,549
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted).
495. Castaneda,980 S.W.2d at 780 (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686,
690 (Tex. 1989)).
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all contrary evidence. 496 If this examination produces no evidence to support the jury's answer, the court of appeals then examines the record to
determine whether the contrary proposition is established as a matter of

law. 497 The Castaneda court found the evidence legally sufficient to sup-

port the jury's findings of causation and comparative negligence, 49 8 but
reversed the trial court's $10 million judgment in favor of the plaintiff
499
because of improper venue.
In reviewing a venue point in an appeal from a final judgment, the
court of appeals looks at the entire record, including the actual trial.5 00 If
there is any probative evidence that the defendant maintained an agency
or had a representative in the county of suit, the court of appeals must
defer to the trial court's venue determination. 5 1 If the record is devoid
of any such evidence, the court of appeals must remand the case to be
transferred to a county of proper venue. 50 2 Noting that the venue facts
bore "a striking resemblance '503 to those in the supreme court's recent
Miles decision, 5°4 the court of appeals held that the only fact tying venue
to Duval County, the existence of a General Motors dealership in the
county,5 0 5 was "not evidence that that dealership is an agent or represen-

tative of the manufacturer whose product it sells," 50 6 and that, as a result,
there was no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the
dealership was the agent or representative of General Motors under the
venue statute 507 then applicable, section 15.037 of the Texas Civil Practice
50 8
and Remedies Code.
In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,509 the supreme court, following its decision in Broders v. Heise,510 reaffirmed that the trial court's
exclusion of expert testimony, whether based on the factors enunciated in
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See id. at 780(causation) and 782 (comparative negligence).
499. See id. at 782-83.

500. See id. at *4 (citing Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993)).
501. See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. 1998)). In Castaneda, the plaintiff and the individual defendant driver who collided with her resided in
Nueces County, where the collision occurred. See Castaneda, 980 S.W.2d at 782.
502. See id.
503. Id.
504. Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 377 (Tex. 1998).
505. Castaneda, 980 S.W.2d at 782.
506. Id. (citing Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 382).
507. See id.
508. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.037 (West 1986), repealed effective August 28, 1995, states, in pertinent part:
Foreign corporations ... not incorporated by the laws of this state, and doing
business in this state, may be sued in any county in which all or a part of the
cause of action accrued, or in any county in which the company may have an
agency or representative, or in the county in which the principal office of the
company may be situated, or, if the defendant corporation has no agent or
representative in this state, then in the county in which the plaintiff or either
of them reside.
509. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
510. 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1996).
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Daubert,51' Robinson512 and Havner5 13 or on Texas Rule of Evidence
702, 5 1 4 is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. 515
In Operation Rescue-National v. PlannedParenthood,Inc.,516 an appeal
from a judgment awarding damages and permanent injunctive relief
against Operation Rescue arising from its activities against abortion providers during the 1992 Republican National Convention in Houston, the
supreme court reviewed the trial court's error in refusing to instruct the
jury that the "act" required to be found in furtherance of a civil conspiracy must be "overt and unlawful" 51 7 under the standard for reversible
error set forth in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 61.1(a). 518 The
supreme court held that, in view of the undisputed evidence of overt,
unlawful acts by petitioners, 51 9 the jury's findings that petitioners committed certain enumerated wrongful acts, 52 0 and the absence of "evidence
or argument that any conspiracy among the petitioners was confined to
lawful means or purposes or that the actions of petitioners in furtherance
of the conspiracy were not overt,"521 the error was held to be harmless. 522
The supreme court then turned to petitioners' complaint that the permanent injunction entered by the trial court, which limited petitioners'
access to the clinics and the homes of physicians who worked at the clinics, 5 23 violated their right to free expression protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution 524 and by Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.5 25 The court followed the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.52 6 and
Schenck v. Pro-ChoiceNetwork 527 in its analysis of the standard of review
applicable to First Amendment claims, holding that the permanent in511. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
512. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
513. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
514. TEX. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702, effective March 1, 1998, states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
The supreme court referred to Rule 702 throughout its opinion in Gammill despite the fact
that the former Texas Rules of Civil Evidence (effective at the time of trial in Gammill)
were replaced by the Texas Rules of Evidence on March 1, 1998, noting that "none of the
changes in the new rules affect this case." Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 718, n. 8.
515. Gamnill, 972 S.W.2d at 719, nil (citing Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 151).
516. 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998).
517. See id. at 553.
518. TEX. R. App. P. 61.1(a). Rule 61.1(a) states: "No judgment may be reversed on
appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the Supreme Court
concludes that the error complained of: (a) probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment."
519. See Operation Rescue, 975 S.W.2d at 553.
520. See id.
521. See id. at 553-54
522. See id. at 554
523. See id.
524. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
525. TEX. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
526. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
527. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
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junction passes First Amendment scrutiny only if it "burden[s] no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. ' 52 8 The
reviewing court must apply this test by considering "the injury asserted,
the relief requested, and the underlying evidence. '529
The supreme court then addressed the standard of review governing
claims under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. 530 Conceding
that certain of the court's prior decisions had said that Article I, Section 8
of the Texas Constitution is "broader" or affords "greater" protection of
speech than the First Amendment, 53 1 the court noted that in none of
those decisions was a different standard applied under the state constitutional provision than required by the First Amendment. 5 32
Admitting that, in its decision in Tucci, the court "misunderstood the
First Amendment test for injunctive restrictions on speech, as we now
know from Madsen,' 533 the court stated:
We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech
should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution
than the First Amendment.
The considerations relevant to determining the protection to be afforded speech in the present context are the same under both the
federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, we conclude, as the
Supreme Court has in Madsen and Schenck, that an injunction in
these circumstances must burden no more
speech than necessary to
534
serve a significant government interest.
The court then reaffirmed the settled rule that a trial court's issuance of
injunctive relief is reviewable for abuse of discretion, 535 observing that
"[O]f course, a trial court has no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional guarantees or without supporting evidence. ' 536
In Ford Motor Co. v. Miles,537 the supreme court followed the standard
stated in its decision in Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc. 538 and held that the reviewing court considering a complaint that the trial court erred in failing to
grant a motion to transfer venue must review the entire record:
528. Operation Rescue, 975 S.W.2d at 560.
529. Id. at 562 (quoting Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., plurality opinion)).
530. See id. at 557-60.
531. See id. at 558, n.41 (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. 1992)
("[A]rticle one, section eight of the Texas Constitution provides greater rights of free expression than its federal equivalent.") and Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 5 (Doggett, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 62) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
("[Tjhe free speech guarantees of the Texas Constitution are greater than the guarantees
provided by the First Amendment.")).
532. See id. at 558.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 560.
535. See id. (citing Clark v. Salinas, 628 S.W.2d 51, 51 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam); Big
Three Indus., Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 618 S.W.2d 543, 548-49 (Tex. 1981); and Repka v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 542, 186 S.W.2d 977, 981 (1945)).
536. Id. (footnotes omitted).
537. 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998).
538. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
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If there is any probative evidence in the entire record that Ford [the
defendant] maintained an agency or had a representative in Rusk
County, even if the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary,
we must defer to the trial court's determination that venue was
proper in the county of suit. If there is no such evidence, venue did
not lie in Rusk County, and the case must be transferred
to Dallas
539
County where it is undisputed that venue is proper.
In Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,540 an action by landowners challenging
the town's denial of their application for planned development of their
property as an unconstitutional taking, the supreme court followed the
standards of review from its prior decisions on ripeness and state and
federal constitutional claims in finding the claims ripe for review but affirming the court of appeals' take nothing judgment against the landowners. 541 The supreme court held as an initial matter that ripeness, which is
an element of subject matter jurisdiction, is "a legal question subject to de
''542
novo review that a court can raise sua sponte.
After determining that the landowners' claims against the town were
ripe, the supreme court considered the effect on appeal of the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that "the ultimate question of whether a zoning ordinance constitutes a compensable taking or
violates due process or equal protection is a question of law, not a question of fact."'543 Accordingly, the reviewing court must "consider all of
the surrounding circumstances" 544 and "depend on the district court to
resolve disputed facts regarding the extent of the governmental intrusion
on the property" 545 even though "the ultimate determination of whether
the facts are sufficient to constitute a taking is a question of law" 546 under
both state and federal law.
539. Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 380 (citing Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 758) (citations omitted).
540. 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Aug. 6,
1998) (No. 98-249).
541. See Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 925. The trial court determined that the landowners'
case was ripe for adjudication and that the landowners were entitled to judgment on their
procedural and substantive due process and equal protection claims under the federal and
state constitutions, rendering a money judgment of over $8.5 million for the landowners.
Id. at 927-28. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and dismissed the landowners'
claims, holding that none of the claims was ripe for review. Town of Sunnyvale v. Mayhew,
905 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994). In a supplemental opinion, the court of appeals
addressed the landowners' claims in light of the supreme court's decision in Taub v. City of
Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995) and concluded
that, even if the claims were ripe, the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial
court's findings. 905 S.W.2d at 259-68.
542. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928 (citing, inter alia, Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993)).
543. Id. at 932-33 (citing City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802,
804 (Tex. 1984); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971); and DuPuy
v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 110 (Tex. 1965)).
544. Id. at 933 (citing City of College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 804; Hunt, 462 S.W.2d at
539; City of Bellaire v. Lamkin, 159 Tex. 141, 317 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1958); and City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477, 481 (1955)).
545. Id. (citing Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. 1997)).
546. Id., n. 3 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946)).
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The application of a general zoning law to a particular property constitutes a regulatory taking if "the ordinance 'does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests' or it denies an owner all 'economically viable
use of his land.' ' 547 The supreme court also held that a compensable
regulatory taking can occur when "governmental agencies impose restrictions that either (1) deny landowners of [sic] all economically viable use
of their property, or (2) unreasonably interfere with landowners' rights to
use and enjoy their property. ' 548 "A restriction denies the landowner all
economically viable use of the property or totally destroys the value of
'549
the property if the restriction renders the property valueless.
In contrast, the determination of whether the government has unreasonably interfered with a landowner's right to use and enjoy property
requires consideration of two factors: "the economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations. '5 50 In determining the economic impact of a
regulation, the reviewing court "merely compares the value that has been
taken from the property with the value that remains in the property," 551
and consideration is not usually given to the "loss of anticipated gains or
future profits. ' 552 In determining the investment-backed expectation of
the landowner, the court must examine the "existing and permitted uses
of the property, '5 53 which "constitute the 'primary expectation' of the
landowner that is affected by regulation. '554 The court should also consider "knowledge of existing zoning.., in determining whether the regu'555
lation interferes with investment-backed expectations.
The standard of review for substantive due process challenges is deferential, and a court should not set aside a zoning determination for a substantive due process violation "unless the action 'has no foundation in
reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no
substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public
safety or the public welfare in its proper sense."'' 556 The zoning decision
must be upheld if it is "at least fairly debatable that the decision was
'55 7
rationally related to legitimate government interests.
The standard of appellate consideration of whether a zoning decision
constitutes an "as-applied" equal protection violation is whether "the
547. Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
548. Id. at 935 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19
& n. 8 (1992)).
549. Id.
550. Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n. 8; and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
551. Id. at 936 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987)).
552. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
553. Id.
554. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136).
555. Id. (citing Pompa Constr. Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F.2d 418, 424-25
(2d Cir. 1983)).
556. Id. at 938 (quoting Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928)).
557. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).
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government treat[s] the claimant different[ly] from other similarly-situated landowners without any reasonable basis. '558 Unless the ordinance
discriminates against a suspect class, it must only be "rationally related to
'5 59
a legitimate state interest to survive an equal protection challenge.
The standard of review for procedural due process takings claims requires only that, "[i]f an individual is deprived of a property right, the
government must afford an appropriate and meaningful
opportunity to be
'560
heard to comport with procedural due process.
XIV.

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL

A court of appeals may not render judgment on liability in a summary
judgment proceeding unless both parties have sought final relief on the
claim in cross motions for summary judgment. 56 1 Specifically, in CU
Lloyd's v. Feldman, an insurance coverage dispute, Lloyd's, an insurer,
moved for final summary judgment on Feldman's, an alleged insured,
breach of contract claims, claiming it had no duty to defend because Feldman was not an insured under the policy. 562 In response, Feldman moved
for partial summary judgment on the issues of the existence and breach of
the duty to defend. 563 The trial court granted Lloyd's motion for final
summary judgment and denied Feldman's motion for partial summary
5 64
judgment.
On appeal, the First Court of Appeals concluded that Feldman was an
insured under the policy, and that Lloyd's therefore owed Feldman a duty
to defend. 56 5 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Lloyd's, and then, after determining Lloyd's had breached its duty to defend, rendered judgment in favor
566
of Feldman.
The supreme court reversed. Recognizing that, when considering cross
motions for summary judgment, "a court of appeals may reverse and
render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered, ' 567 the
supreme court nonetheless held that, "before a court of appeals may reverse summary judgment for one party and render judgment for the other
party, both parties must ordinarily have sought final judgment relief in
558. Id. at 939 (citing Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991)).
559. Id. (citing Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th
Cir. 1993); and Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 507 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943 (1991)).
560. Id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); and
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
561. See CU Lloyd's v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
562. See id. at 568.
563. See id. at 568-69.
564. See id. at 569.
565. See id.
566. See id.
567. Id.
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their cross motions for summary judgment.

5' 6

XV. TRANSFERRED APPEALS
Under section 73.001 of the Texas Government Code, "[t]he supreme
court may order cases transferred from one court of appeals to another at
any time that, in the opinion of the supreme court, there is good cause for
the transfer. '5 69 When a case is transferred from one court of appeals to
another, is the transferee court required to follow the holdings of the
court in which district the appeal arose? This question was posed to the
Texarkana Court of Appeals in Perez v. Murff,570 an appeal that was
transferred from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals to the Texarkana
court.5 71 Rejecting this proposition, the Texarkana court stated:
The theory of our law is that the State of Texas has but one law on
any given subject, and that the law is as proclaimed by the courts of
appeals and finally, in civil cases, by the Texas Supreme Court.
This theory acknowledges that there may be differences of opinion
among the courts of appeals as to what that law is. The remedy for
572
such conflicts or errors is an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.
The court explained that conflicts of law rules make sense when applied
to separate sovereigns because, in those instances, there really can be
conflicts in the law from one sovereign state to the other. 573 "Where,
however, there is only one sovereign," the court reasoned,
a court of appeals' duty is to decide and apply the law of that sovereign, not to ascertain the law as stated in a given district, whether its
own or the district from which a case has been transferred. The
State
574
of Texas consists of only one sovereign state, not fourteen.
While acknowledging that Texas is a large and diverse state, and that
cases are transferred from one district to another where the justices'
views of what the law of Texas is may differ from the justices of the court
from which the case arose, the court concluded that "the answer to those
difficulties lies in an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court,... rather than

in an effort on our part to be parochial in our application of the law to the
facts presented us." 575 In sum, the Texarkana court held, if the conflict
exists between its decision and the stare decisis of the Fort Worth court,
'576
"it is for the Texas Supreme Court to resolve.
568. Id. The court acknowledged that the court of appeals could have properly rendered judgment on liability alone if the relief sought is a declaratory judgment. See id. In
Lloyd's, however, Feldman sought no declaratory relief and no evidence of damages was
submitted or considered. See id.
569. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1998).

570.
571.
572.
Machs.
GOV'T

573.
574.
575.
576.

972 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
Id. at 85-86 (on rehearing).
Perez, 972 S.W.2d at 85-86 (quoting American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. International Bus.
Corp., 933 S.W.2d 685,688 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied)). See TEX.
CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2)(6) (Vernon 1988).
See id. at 86.
Id.
Id. (citing American Nat'l Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d at 688).
Id.
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